A New Economics for Modern Dynamic Economies by Fusari, Angelo
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive





MPRA Paper No. 74008, posted 25 September 2016 12:42 UTC





In memory of my dear friend Angelo Reati, an 
important student of economics, and to a very important 
living student, Clifford R. Wymer, for his invaluable 
teachings on modelling, simulations and econometric 
application
  It is becoming increasingly clear that a new economics is required for 
investigating modern dynamic economies and the coming social world. 
Important features of those economies, such as innovation, uncertainty 
and  entrepreneurship,  are  usually  considered  capitalist  features.  This 
may have been true historically, but this book argues that the contrary 
will  be  true  for  the  future:  the  full  and  efficient  operation  of  those 
supposed capitalist features will increasingly require the overcoming of 
capitalist civilization.
In  this  book,  Angelo  Fusari  constructs  a  theoretical  framework  for  the 
interpretation  and  management  of  modern  dynamic  economies  which 
demonstrates that deep institutional transformations are essential if we are to 
move  beyond  the  current  consumer-capitalist  age and  the  age  of  the 
domination of financial capital
.  A  New  Economics  for  Modern  Dynamic  Economies opens  with  a 
consideration  of  the  basic  aspects  of  modern  dynamic  economies  and 
proceeds to develop a representation of the whole economic system centered 
on the interrelationships between entrepreneurship, innovation and radical 
uncertainty  in  a  ‘dynamic  competition’  process.  This  model  provides  an 
explanation of business cycles that largely differs from current explanations 
as it  derives  from the  notion  of  dynamic  competition.  The book is  then 
extended from the sectoral to the micro level and then to the level of the  
firm. The second half of the book is concerned with operational problems 
and in  particular  with the integration  of  this  analysis  of  cycles  with the 
notion of historical phases of development. The final chapter explores the 
route of the transition from capitalism to a new economic and social order – 
a transition of vital importance, both for the contemporary world and for the 
coming  world. The  book  also  shows  the  possibility  of  a  scientific 
explanation  of  important  ethical  pinciples  as  indispensable  to  the 
organizational  efficiency  of  social  system:  for  instance,  the  necessity 
and  the  way  to  conciliate  productive  efficiency,  social  justice  and 
individual freedom.
This volume is of great interest to those who study political economy,  
macro-economics and economic theory and philosophy.
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Preface
This book arises out of a sustained critical reflection on (and dissatisfaction with) the 
current  state  of  economic  thought  –  a  reflection  based  upon  the  systematic 
confrontation of current economics with the content of economic reality. The book 
attempts to construct a theoretical framework more adequate than current formula-
tions for the interpretation and management of the economy.
Part  I  considers  basic  aspects  of  modern  dynamic  economies  that  are  largely 
ignored  by the  dominant  schools  of  economic  thought,  or  are  at  best  mentioned 
merely for the sake of the appearance of completeness, and which, in addition, are  
largely misunderstood by the dissenters from the dominant doctrines. Chapter 1 is an 
introductory chapter. It discusses some of the most important variables of modern  
dynamic economies and the explanatory power of their interactions and directs some 
criticisms  at  past  economic  thought  for  completely  or  partially  ignoring  these 
variables. Chapter 2 deepens those criticisms by turning to the method of economic  
and social science; we show that the analysis of social reality needs a third method 
that is in addition to and distinct from those of the natural sciences and the logic-
formal sciences – a method that is founded on completely different postulates, rules 
and  classifications.  On  such  a  basis,  this  chapter  dis-cusses  some  contemporary 
conflicts among schools of thought, particularly the opposition between mainstream 
and  heterodox economics,  which  troubles  current  economic  theory  and  even  the 
teaching  of  eminent  scholars.  Chapter  3  offers  a  representation  of  the  whole 
economic  system  centered  on  the  interrelationships  between  entrepreneurship, 
various  kinds  of  innovations  and  radical  uncertainty  in  a  ‘dynamic  competition’ 
process. The devised model has been formalized at the maximum level of sectoral  
disaggregation (one sector for each specific good) and simulated with a restricted 
number of sectors. It provides an explanation of business cycles that largely differs 
from current explanations, as it derives from the notion of dynamic competition and 
shows that the duration of cycles,  especially the long waves,  is shortened by the 
intensity  of  dynamic  competition  as  a  result  of  the  values  of  some  parameters. 
Chapter 4 extends the analysis and formalization from the sectoral to the micro level.  
Chapter 5 develops the micro analysis with regard to the firm. Finally, Chapter 6 
presents a substantial broad-ening of our understanding of radical uncertainty, the  
most  typical  and  the  most  embarrassing  element  of  economic  dynamics,  and 
probably, notwithstanding its
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growing importance, the most misunderstood. The final section of this chapter 
presents the formalization and estimate of a model of the (intermediate) business 
cycle based on the interaction between innovation and radical uncertainty. This 
cycle  and  those  considered  in  Chapter  3  are  expressions  of  the  theorized 
dynamic competition process – that is, they are implied by the exposition of the  
mechanism of this process; as such, they differ from the various types of cycles  
considered by current economics.
Part II is mainly concerned with operational problems. It commences with Chap-
ter 7, which gives an overview of the economic process that integrates our analysis  
of cycles with the notion of historical  phases of development.  This integration is 
aimed  at  allowing  an  exploration  of  economic  and  social  processes  capable  of 
improving our understanding of the course of history, in particular, of the direction  
of the ever-changing economic world in the wake of the emergence of new basic 
structures  that  will  require  new policies  and  organizational  forms.  Precisely,  the 
changes of organizational procedures (as required by the new general conditions of 
development generated by economic dynamics), which mark the passage from one 
historical  phase  to  another,  will  facilitate  understanding  of  the  advent  of  new 
features of cycles that develop over the course of history, as well as the content and 
administration of future economic order and development. This introductory chap-
ter guides the development of the whole of Part II. It seems to us that the absence in 
economics and social studies of a grafting of cycles on historical phases and of an  
explanation of cycles based on the phenomenon of dynamic competition constitute 
two fundamental lacunae of economic theory; this is indeed a great drawback if we 
wish to be able to  understand the changing content of cycles  over the course of  
history and also the variable institutional (and ethical) needs of societies over time to 
manage their coming into being.
Chapters 8 and 9 are concerned with the role of demand and the question of 
economic-social and territorial dualism. Chapter 10 treats of money and finan-
cial  variables,  which play very important  roles in any characterization of the 
globalization process; the analysis of money also offers a continuation of key 
themes treated in the earlier discussion of demand. Chapter 11 concerns the ethi-
cal dimension in economics on which the globalization process today confers a 
growing importance. The final chapter explores the content of a possible transi-
tion from capitalism to some new economic and social order (building on some 
anticipations of this matter set out in the two previous chapters); such a transi-
tion would appear of vital importance, both for the contemporary world and the 
coming world.
A number of chapters make substantial  use of mathematical  formalization and 
modeling.  The  intention  is  to  make  their  content  stringent  and  to  clarify  how 
mathematical  specification is able to act  as an important tool in representing and 
explaining economic processes; it is to be hoped that this clarification will contrib-
ute to overcoming the growing mistrust for mathematics by many economists and 
students  of  the  social  sciences,  a  mistrust  caused  by frequent  oversimplification  
through mathematics and the resulting distortions, mainly in the work of neoclassi-
cal economists. In particular, Chapter 3 and, even more so, Chapter 4 should not be
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read  as  affected  displays  of  mathematical  virtuosity  but  taken,  rather,  as 
providing a demonstration of  the flexibility of  mathematical  formalization in 
representing with realism important aspects of economic dynamics. Moreover, 
we  set  out  some  considerations  on  the  appropriate  use  and  limitations  of 
econometrics  in  the  study  of  modern  dynamic  economies  and  societies  as 
characterized by growing nonre-petitiveness of events.
However, mathematical formalization is not a dominant feature of the book; 
history, sociology and political science are not passed over, but rather they play 
an important role in the proposed theoretical development of economics.
The chapters in Part I theorize on the present, but in doing so take care that  
the foundations of  the  theory rest  on solid  ground and,  as  such,  are  able to 
illuminate the future. But the past is not ignored, especially in Chapter 2, which 
criticizes previous theoretical approaches. Chapters 8 and 9 in Part II are, for the 
most part, concerned with the past, while the three chapters that follow move 
from important traits of the past and the present economic situation to set out, as  
just  alluded  to,  some  proposals  envisaging  necessary  organizational  forms 
concern-ing the future.
I  first  began  to  intensify  my  meditation  on  economic  problems  at  the 
beginning of the 1970s as a result of my professional work on Italian economic 
programming at ISPE (Institute of Studies for Economic Programming), which 
was then the main Italian research institution on this subject. A real theoretical  
and operational enthusiasm then operated within the programming circles; it was 
an  enthusiasm  fueled  by  the  participation  of  renowned  Italian  and  foreign 
economists and soci-ologists in the preparation of the national economic plans 
and  by frequent  erudite  debates,  meetings  and  conferences  enlivened  by the 
charisma of important stu-dents and Nobel laureates.
My growing doubts as to the validity of various celebrated theories first arose by 
way  of  comparison  between  factual  reality  and  the  enunciated  programmatic 
principles.  Subsequent experience in macro and sectorial planning instilled in my 
mind  the  conviction  that  great  misunderstandings  were  caused  by  profound 
equivocations on method. The upsetting evidence of those equivocations and mis-
understandings has driven me to a laborious process of reflection and inquiry into  
the methods of economics and the social sciences, a work that has ultimately come 
to constitute the core of my scientific production and publications.
This  book  is  intended  to  offer  some  basic  lines  of  a  new economics  that  is  
appropriate  for  investigating  modern  dynamic  economies  and  the  coming  social 
world. Important features of those economies, such as innovation, uncertainty and 
entrepreneurship, are usually considered as essentially capitalist features. This is true 
from  a  historical  perspective,  capitalism  having  been  the  parent  of  the  modern 
dynamic economies and societies. Nevertheless, we shall see that the contrary is true 
for the future: the full and efficient operation of those supposed capitalist features  
will increasingly require the overcoming of capitalist civilization. At any rate, it is 
impossible,  or,  at  the  very  least,  it  will  be  extremely  troublesome,  to  pro-ceed 
without building up the institutional transformations (functional imperatives) caused 
by the transitions through the historical age of conflictual-consumeristic
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capitalism and the present age of financial (global) capitalism, as explained in 
the last three chapters of this book.
Some repetitions that occur over the course of the chapters should be met with 
patience on behalf of the reader, for they reinforce appreciation for, as well as 
deepen understanding of, crucial aspects of our analysis in addition to allowing 
an independent reading of each chapter.
Part I
Theoretical frame
1 Innovation,  uncertainty, 
entrepreneurship
Modeling the dynamic 
process of the economy
Abstract
This chapter focuses on some crucial variables that express (and determine) the 
content and the functioning of modern dynamic economies. These variables, the 
most  important  of  which  are  innovation,  radical  uncertainty  and 
entrepreneurship,  are  usually  ignored  and  even  treated  as  annoyances  by 
traditional  economists.  Yet  the  interactions  between  them,  and  the 
corresponding  notion  of  dynamic  competition,  provide  the  core  of  our 
theoretical  construction.  In  consequence,  our  construction  provides  the 
substance for, and indeed points to, some potentially stimulating criticisms of 
the main orthodox and heterodox economic theories as well as a new design for 
political economy. This opening discussion is thus intended to prepare the road 
for the whole theoretical and empirical construction that follows.
1.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses some misunderstandings that afflict economic thought in 
an  attempt  to  contribute  to  their  clarification.  They concern  three  important 
aspects of the economy tightly linked each other: innovation, uncertainty and 
entrepreneur-ship. Their interaction will be represented here through the notion 
of dynamic competition.
This feature of the economy is inconsistent with the analytical apparatus of 
mainstream economics that, as a consequence, has yielded completely delusive 
results despite the use of sophisticated techniques and procedures. The situation 
is made worse by the fact that the various branches of heterodox economics, 
even if animated by an acute and growing dissatisfaction toward mainstream 
economics,  have not offered  a satisfactory treatment  of the three aspects  but 
only  a  fragmented  analytical  panorama.  A study of  the  matter  must  meet  a 
complex and encroaching intellectual apparatus that has been built over time on 
methodological  bases that,  although fashionable,  are substantially misleading. 
This will oblige us to start from some consideration on method but is limited 
here to what is absolutely indispens-able. The chapter is articulated as follows.
Section  1.2  sets  out  at  first  some  brief  considerations  on  method,  mainly 
addressed to economics. Then it presents a simple and concise representation of the 
productive  process  that  is  mainly  centered  on  the  phenomenon  of  dynamic 
competition. It follows an analysis of uncertainty and innovation and a treatment of  
fixed capital, which is a protagonist of dynamic motion and is deeply concerned with 
innovation  and  uncertainty.  The  section  ends  up  with  a  brief  description  of  the 
dynamic  and  cyclical  motion  of  the  economy.  These  analyses  will  provide  the 
foundations  of  subsequent  development.  Section  1.3  expounds  a  critical  review, 
starting with some main omissions and equivocations of general economics. After-
ward,  we  discuss  two  enlightening  approaches  that  provide  the  premises  for  a 
satisfactory treatment of dynamic competition; this allows showing a missing ring, 
represented  by  the  postulate  of  immeasurability  of  radical  uncertainty  and  the 
impossibility  of  its  explanation,  a  postulate  that  strongly  opposes  the  necessary 
theoretical clarifications and advancement. We then suggest that the current insis-
tence on bounded rationality, polemically with the neoclassical theory of perfect    
knowledge, has accentuated the difficulty of formalizing dynamic competition 
and caused various equivocations on decision making. Some consideration on 
institutions, with reference to the theory of the firm, will follow. The hope of 
these analyses  is to stimulate some implementation of the economic research 
along lines that have been insufficiently deepened until now.
1.2   The theoretical foundations of our economic analysis 
1.2.1   Some consideration on method: a clarifying example 
The reader of this chapter may ask why, if our focalization on the importance of 
dynamic competition – and specifically a measure and explanation of radi - cal 
(endogenous) uncertainty – is right, economists have dedicated so little attention 
to  the  matter.  To  answer  this,  a  brief  treatment  on  method,  specifi  -  cally 
referred to economics, is required. This important subject will be better analyzed 
in Chapter 2.1
The persistent acceleration of social change has determined a growing con-
sciousness of economists and other social students of both the erroneousness of 
the postulate of repetition (and mere acceptance of the given situation) typical of 
the method of natural sciences and of the importance to consider appropriately 
the investigated reality.  Unfortunately,  this realization has led to an excess of 
analyti-cal fragmentation and hence a lack of comparability among theories; a 
main  cause  of  that  is  the  frequent  denial  of  the  feasibility  of  shared 
methodological rules that make possible the confrontation among students and 
the  control  of  theoretical  hypotheses.  As  a  consequence,  many  economists 
proceed freely; so an inconclu-sive and sterile pluralism is born, consisting in a  
variety of incompatible positions unable to interact.
An important aspect of the situation is economists’ disregard for the explanation 
and  measurability  of  uncertainty.  Proper  (or  radical)  uncertainty  contradicts  the 
postulate  of  the  repetition  of  phenomena,  implied  by observational  method,  thus 
making itself unacceptable to the followers of that method. A frequent and easy way 
to set aside radical uncertainty is using ‘abstract rationality’ criterion and/or referring 
uncertainty to known subjective or objective distributions of probability, as is typical  
of the economics of perfect knowledge. Unfortunately, heterodox economics (and its 
criticism of mainstream economics),  which strongly insists on radical uncertainty, 
the implied limits of knowledge and the connected notion of bounded rationality, has 
been  conquered  by  the  ideas  of  the  immeasurability  and  nonexplanation  of 
uncertainty.
To complete this analysis, it is necessary to remember the main methodologi-
cal considerations that induce us to insist on some current misunderstandings on 
uncertainty, innovation and entrepreneurship. Unlike the natural sciences, social 
sciences concern a reality that is generated by man. This is obvious. What is not  
so obvious is the implication that social sciences, in order to properly investigate  
this reality, must focus on the better ways to organize social relations, that is, the 
institutional pillars of these.
Innovation, uncertainty, entrepreneurship 
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The investigation on the organizational form of society may usefully start from 
some basic aspects of the considered reality (the character of the existing general 
conditions  of  development)  and  deduce  their  implications.  In  fact,  those  basic 
aspects  require some organizational forms of the economic system coherent with 
them, the absence of which would weaken the competitiveness and sustainability of 
economic  order.  Uncertainty  and  the  connected  phenomena  of  innovation  and 
entrepreneurship represent some of those organizational features and premises.
Keynesian economics clarifies this question well, but such clarification has 
not been pointed out by the numerous debates on Keynesian teaching. The core 
of such teaching can be outlined as follows:
• A main aspect of the general conditions of development of modern age is 
endogenous radical uncertainty caused by innovation.
• Uncertainty and the state of expectations imply, mainly through their influ-
ence on investment, that effective demand be either insufficient or in excess 
relative to production and hence reduce output or stimulate inflation.
• It  follows that  the control  of  effective demand is a main ‘organizational 
require-ment’ or necessity of modern economies.
• This implies some important programmatic, normative and institutional pre-
scriptions, such as redistributive policies, welfare state, fiscal and monetary 
policies and deficit spending.
As  we  can  see,  Keynesian  theory  starts  from an  important  feature  of  the 
modern general conditions of development, that is, radical uncertainty and the 
possible deficiency of effective demand, and deduces some crucial implications 
or orga-nizational necessities. Unfortunately, Keynesian teaching limits itself to 
such  an  aspect.  Moreover,  it  concerns  macroeconomics,  thus  omitting  the 
microeconomic  aspects  of  modern  economies  linked  to  uncertainty,  mainly 
entrepreneurship and the explanation of innovation.
Let us reassert that the analysis that will follow emphasizes the relationship 
among entrepreneurship, innovation and uncertainty and their implications. The 
functional and organizational requirements implied by these phenomena are not 
deterministic  entities  that  are  automatically  engendered  by  the  economic 
process; they may be absent or badly reflected within the social system. Specific 
attention may be needed to remedy this deficiency.
1.2.2   Dynamic competition and economic development 
Let’s give now a schematic representation of economic process.
In  a  market  economy,  production is  a  way to get  profit  in  the  context  of 
dynamic  competition.  This  statement  is  referable  to  private  and  public 
entrepreneurship  since,  in  any  case,  profit  rate  matters  for  accountability 
purposes, that is, to mea-sure an entrepreneur’s degree of success.
Economic phenomena, as resulting from some actions and decisions taken inde-
pendently by a plurality of agents, generally assume different and even opposite
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contents from expected results. It is mistaken to think this fracture (between actions 
and  results)  may be  remedied  through a  centralized  system  of  decision  making. 
Centralization only makes sense in a stationary society; it cannot face creative and 
innovative  events,  as  these  imply  a qualitative  leap with respect  to  the previous 
situation. In fact, the centralization of decision making is inconsistent with a world  
of beings endowed with limited capabilities but who are able to evolve. It tends to  
suppress  novelties  as  it  is  almost  impotent  toward  them  and  hence  suffocates 
innovation and creativity, pushing economic systems toward a stationary state.
Advancement in knowledge, as well as in material and spiritual conditions, 
proceeds by trial and error, through a plurality of intuitions, decisions and initia-
tives in competition with each other. This requires the building of institutions 
able  to  stimulate  personal  qualities,  especially  creativity,  to  evaluate  the 
achieved results and to facilitate coordination among the plurality of decisions. 
At  the  basis  of  these  organizational  requirements  there  is  the  limitation  of 
knowledge, that is, uncertainty.
A  qualitative  and  decisive  leap  in  human  history  took  place  when  the 
economy  began  to  display  an  extraordinary  ability  to  stimulate  and  govern 
innovation and took central stage in the social system. The modern age started at 
that  point.  All  seems to indicate that  the economic system will  preserve  this 
strategic position, even if flanked in the future by some other social subsystems.  
In fact, the economy is well equipped to operate in the presence of uncertainty 
and to stimulate explo-ration; in other words, it is well equipped to govern and 
feed the dynamism of social process. In particular, the economy has developed 
an  efficient  mechanism  of  the  coordination  of  individual  initiatives  that,  in 
addition, strongly stimulates innovation, gets information on tendencies at work 
and is clever in evaluating the degree of appropriateness of decision making and 
can adjust this as needed. Such a mechanism of production is represented by the 
competition  in  the  market  and  the  search  for  profit;  it  is  a  mechanism that 
warrants the adjustment to unpredict-able events and attributes with inflexibility 
the merit and responsibility for success and failure in the entrepreneur’s main 
function,  that  is,  in  meeting  unpredictable  events.  The  economy  has  also 
developed the key agent of such a mechanism, the entrepreneur, who meets and, 
through innovation, stimulates uncertainty with the purpose of making profit.
It is our hope that this brief description has shown some key elements for the 
representation  of  the  dynamic  competition  process:  the  market  warrants  the 
coor-dination over time and space of individual initiatives, in particular demand 
and supply,  while  the entrepreneurial  arbitrage,  aimed at  getting profit  from 
market disequilibria, tends to erase profit opportunities deriving from ‘errors’ 
and mar-ket disequilibria. If entrepreneurs limited themselves to arbitrage, very 
low  profit  would  result.  But  the  entrepreneur  can  recreate  disequilibria, 
uncertainty and the connected profit opportunities through innovation; thus even 
scarcely creative entrepreneurs can profit both through imitation of innovations 
and because these recreate spaces for arbitrage.
The described innovation-adaptation mechanism is not limited to the economy but 
constitutes a basic expression of social-historical processes and hence is an
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important analytical tool for the interpretation of those processes.2 But it is the 
economy that exhibits the best and more efficient innovation -adaptation mecha-
nism that, in addition, can be formalized and investigated in quantitative terms. 
The starting point of the dynamic process is innovation; but the entrepreneurial 
arbitrage and imitation of innovations push toward a stationary state, thus reduc-
ing uncertainty and the opportunities of arbitrage and imitation of innovations; 
this stimulates the introduction of novelties and hence a new rise of disequilibria 
and uncertainty that discourage further innovation, both directly and due to the 
advent of new profit opportunities through arbitrage. So, we have an incessant 
disequilibrating-equilibrating  economic  process  pushed  by  the  adaptive  and 
inno-vative search, discovery and creation of profit opportunities.
We call  this  form of  competition,  which  strongly  characterizes  economic 
action and production in modern age, the notion of  dynamic competition; it is 
hinged  on  entrepreneurial  innovative  and  adaptive  action  directed  to  take 
advantage of exist-ing opportunities and create new ones, and it results from the 
interaction between entrepreneurship, innovation and uncertainty. One main task 
of  economics  should  be  the  combination  of  those  components  in  a  unitary 
process that is able to explain innovation, uncertainty and entrepreneurship.
This dynamic competition is the basic mechanism of economic development 
and would be impossible in the absence both of uncertainty and the connected 
limitation of knowledge. Moreover, we shall see later that uncertainty is the cru-
cial variable explaining both the demand and supply of entrepreneurship, and, in 
fact, this is inseparable from the phenomenon of radical uncertainty. Therefore, 
an accurate treatment of uncertainty is of central importance, and we will soon 
show that some misunderstandings in this regard are a main impediment to an 
acceptable specification of the notion of dynamic competition.
The current omission or fragmentation of the analysis of dynamic competition is a 
great  lack  of  economics.  This  competition  completely  differs  from  that  usually 
represented through the inclination of demand and supply curves: in fact, it causes 
day-by-day changes in those curves, creates new ones and influences costs, quality 
of products and so forth. The usual theoretical treatment of production based on the 
notion of production function well expresses the dimensions and the seriousness of 
the analytical lack of (and disregard for) dynamic competition. In fact, the produc-
tion function approach is only apparent in accordance with evidence; in effect, that 
accordance is warranted only in a stationary economy. In incorporating a production 
function in dynamic analysis, various and sophisticated modifications of that func-
tion have been developed, mainly the inclusion of human capital and exogenous or 
endogenous technical progress. But no satisfactory results have been achieved along 
this line. A production function is useful if it  is limited to cost specification. But 
other  elements,  in  addition  to  cost,  influence  production.  These  elements  can  be 
taken into account only through the help of the notion of dynamic competition.
We hope that the previous considerations on the importance of such phenomena will 
stimulate  the  production  of  statistical  data  on  innovation,  entrepreneurship  and 
radical uncertainty – the basic components of the process of dynamic competition – 
so as to remedy a quite incredible lacuna of statistical economics in the field.
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1.2.3 Radical uncertainty – the mistaken postulate of the  
impossibility of its explanation and measurability: the  
difference between uncertainty and expectations
This subsection specifically considers the question of uncertainty. The probability 
that, in the throwing of a well-balanced die, a determined face appears is undoubt-
edly one in six and expresses probabilistic certainty. This objective probability does 
not  involve  capabilities  and  does  not  express  uncertainty;  it  is  the  same  for 
everybody.  On the  contrary,  uncertainty involves  capabilities.  Some people  have 
better knowledge than others, some are cleverer, and some can adapt themselves to 
new events. Subjective distributions of probability are not identical for everybody, 
and they involve capability. But the subjective probabilistic approach presumes that 
the decision-maker knows the probabilities  of the considered events; instead, true 
uncertainty is an expression of the degree of ignorance. Speaking of expecta-tions,  
we shall see better that subjective probability has nothing to do with true (or radical)  
uncertainty, even if an eventual measure of this uncertainty should help to define 
subjective probability or expectations. Radical (or true) uncertainty simply expresses 
the lack of knowledge.
A growing number of students define uncertainty as each aleatory phenom-enon 
that  cannot  be  included  in  the  notion  of  probability.  They  also  maintain  that 
uncertainty is impossible to measure and hence impossible to insure. This notion of 
uncertainty, apparently simple and clear, implies serious errors and confusions on 
measurability and insurability. Some clarifications are, therefore, indispensable.
In deciding on future events, an entrepreneur must formulate expectations.
Some of the corresponding probability distribution will be well defined and the 
properties of the distribution either known or able to be specified to sufficiently 
good accuracy; others will not and will be more or even highly subjective. It is 
very important to measure the degree of reliability of the expectations, which 
does  not  correspond  to  a  well-defined  probability  distribution  and  hence 
probabilistic  certainty.  The  degree  of  variability,  or  the  dispersion,  of 
expectations expresses radical uncertainty. It is senseless to deny the possibility 
of measuring and explain-ing such uncertainty; as a matter of fact, entrepreneurs 
must pay a great attention to get that measure. Expectations lacking in a measure 
of their reliability may be very deceitful.
It is important to underline that the question of insurability has no relevance in 
discussing uncertainty. Probably all possible events are insurable at a price; whether 
insurance is used depends on the cost and the assessment of the effect of having or  
not  having  it.  Insurance  companies  may  dislike  treating  very  high  degrees  of 
uncertainty,  but  this  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  impossibility  of  measur-ing 
uncertainty that, in fact, is supposed to be very high. It is well known that vari-ous 
hazardous  events  are  insured  even  though  they  cannot  be  expressed  through 
probability  distributions  allowing a  precise  measure  of  the  risk  corresponding to 
them. Insurance does not strictly need probability calculus; in fact, it was practiced 
much before such calculus was invented. Fire risks or theft and shipwreck risks are 
roughly classified to make possible their consolidation. Their insurance is not
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based  on  some  accurate  probability  calculation;  nevertheless,  it  is  made 
convenient by its low cost relative to the damages that the occurrence of those 
events would cause.
On the contrary, it does not make sense to insure the casual events concerning 
dynamic competition among firms; nevertheless, the entrepreneur takes a great 
care to measure the variability of expectations (or uncertainty), as just seen. The 
imposition by law of insurance for the benefit of creditors of bankrupt firms may 
be imagined, but not insurance aimed at avoiding bankruptcy; that contradicts 
dynamic competition, as we shall see soon. The insurance of firms’ losses is  
made senseless not by the impossibility of measuring business uncertainty but  
by the peculiar content of the dynamic competition process. As we know, this 
process  is  made  active  by  the  search  for  profit  opportunities,  that  is,  the 
tendency to use entrepreneurial skills to get profits. But insurance against firms’ 
losses tends to erase profit and implies the renunciation of the entrepreneurial 
role, making the entrepreneur similar to a foolhardy gambler; to cover insurance 
costs, he would look for ill-considered opportunities of profit  and this would 
cause the rise of insurance costs, distort entrepreneurial function and hence push 
the gambler out of the market.
In conclusion, the uninsurability of firms’ results is not a consequence of the 
impossibility of measuring uncertainty, but of the fact that businesses need the 
competence – that is, the judgment, intuition and responsibility – of decision-
makers when facing uncertainty. The insurance of firms’ losses would distort the 
role and use of those indispensable skills, so that these false entrepreneurs would 
be defeated by the competition of more genuine entrepreneurship.
Radical uncertainty is a result of innovation in the context of the dynamic com-
petition process.3 This is the key of its explanation that, in turn (and as we shall see),  
allows the explanation of entrepreneurship and its  role,  use and formation.  More 
precisely, uncertainty is explained by radical process innovations and their diffusion, 
radical product innovations and incremental innovations.
Economics  and empirical  research attempt  to  remedy the  supposed  immeasur-
ability  of  uncertainty through the estimation of expectations.  But,  even if  uncer-
tainty implies expectations, their estimation is a completely different matter from the 
measure  of  the  degree  of  uncertainty.  Expectation,  and  the  notion  of  subjective 
probability (i.e. the degree of confidence that an agent attributes to the fact that some 
event  may  happen),  expresses  hope  that  is  more  or  less  well  founded,  while 
uncertainty simply indicates a limitation of knowledge so that its measure simply 
gives  the degree of  ignorance.  Expectation is,  in  a certain sense, a  pretension of 
knowledge, while uncertainty is an expression of cognitive impotence. Due to these 
differences, the effects of uncertainty on economic variables are different from those 
of expectations; the two take different roles in the economic process.
Economics  has proposed some analytical  expressions to  estimate  expectations: 
static expectations, adaptive expectations and rational expectations. These expres-
sions  give  some  arbitrary  and  oversimplified  formalization.  The  study  of  their 
accuracy, for instance a sensitivity analysis of the effect of changes or errors in the 
parameters of those expressions, is referable to uncertainty. Expectations probably
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represent  the  most  important  aspect  of  entrepreneurship;  their  content  results  on 
entrepreneurial  coup d’oeil, intuition, talent and experience, so that each entrepre-
neur has his proper expectations. Uncertainty is another thing; it has to do with the 
variability of results and it can (and must) be explained and measured. We shall see 
that the postulate of the immeasurability and unexplainability of uncertainty causes 
great  equivocations  and  deprives  economists  of  an  indispensable  variable  to 
represent the economic process with realism.
1.2.4  The problem of fixed capital
The stock of fixed capital is heavily influenced by innovation and by radical uncer-
tainty, and it therefore deserves special treatment in a study focused specifically on 
these two phenomena – all  the more so as present-day analyses  of fixed capi-tal  
mostly  ignore  them.  In  particular,  the  disregard  of  both  those  crucial  aspects  is 
complete  in  the  formalized  general  models  of  the  economy  hinged  upon  the 
accumulation process, such as the Walrasian model with capital accumulation and
Leontief’s input-output dynamic model.
To make evident this limitation (and disregard), it may be useful to dedicate 
some detail to one of the most sophisticated analyses of the subject. Piero Sraffa 
and John von Neumann have inculcated the conviction that the problem of fixed 
capital can be adequately treated only by recourse of joint production models. 
But it seems that despite their formal, mathematical elegance and complications,  
these models offer no advantage in the treatment of fixed capital.
The claim that joint production models (i.e. the expedient of including capital 
goods inherited from the past among the products of the current year) permit the 
exact solution of the problem of depreciation is unfounded. It would be so only 
if technique were immutable. But this is not so. The desperate battle of the neo-
Ricardian economists, with their command of linear algebra, against the difficul-
ties of joint production in the name of the theory of capital resembles an attempt, 
with  daring  architectonical  solutions,  to  construct  an  elegant  building  with 
founda-tions laid on clay. The clay that destabilizes the foundations of the neo-
Ricardian  analysis  is  the  fact  of  technical  progress,  because  when  there  is 
technical  progress,  the  rate  of  obsolescence  has  a  decisive  impact  on  the 
depreciation  table.4 In  this  case,  the  neo-Ricardian  method  of  calculating 
depreciation  and  the  economic  life  of  machinery  by  taking  the  technical  
coefficients, the physical life of machines and the distribution quotas of income 
as givens is incapable of yielding correct and reliable results.
Treating fixed capital through the joint production model is, in principle, no 
way  superior  to  the  Leontief  method of  defining  a  matrix  each  year  of  the 
amounts to depreciate alongside those of fixed and circulating capital. Indeed,  
this second method is simpler and corresponds better to real-world practice.
On the connected theme of the choice of technique, the neo -Ricardian school 
again seems to err on the side of excessive virtuosity.  That is, the criteria of 
technological choice that it develops are solidly grounded only insofar as they 
deal with the problem of ‘truncation,’ that is, determining the economic life of
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machinery (but here too they fall into the difficulties set out previously) . The 
neo-Ricardian  school  posits  that  the  technology considered  has  already been 
introduced (and the only question is to determine how to depreciate it) and that it 
is perfectly known. But when the question is whether or not to adopt a new tech-
nology, a number of complications arise that severely diminish the significance 
of  the  criteria  for  choice  that  the  neo-Ricardians  set  out.  Precisely,  once  a 
technol-ogy  has  been  introduced  there  is  no  turning  back,  even  if  the 
circumstances  that  induced  the  choice  cease,  wholly  or  in  part,  and  the 
technology to be introduced  is almost never  perfectly  known,  given that  the 
proportions between its input ratios generally develop and evolve in the course 
of its creation and depend on a large number of circumstances that are variable 
from case to case and with which the businessman must grapple.
The foregoing means that technological choices cannot be made on the basis of 
the analysis of the ‘factor price frontier,’ since that frontier is unknown. This implies  
that it is unadvisable to base decisions on small variations in profitability.
The decision to introduce a new technology will be made only if the prospective 
benefits are sufficiently great. In particular, these decisions will be made accord-
ing to much more empirical criteria of valuation than the neo-Ricardians would 
maintain.5
In the presence of radical uncertainty (in this case, due to technical progress), the 
prices that are set necessarily rest on fragile bases, given the hypothetical nature of 
the costs for amortization. In these conditions, one way of dealing with uncertainty 
(if the entrepreneur is endowed with a good nose for business and com-mon sense) is  
to set a period for recovering the capital invested and to distribute over that period 
the  depreciation/amortization  quotas,  either  rigidly  or  flexibly,  depending  on  the 
circumstances,  the  policies  adopted  and  so on.  Competition  will  ensure  that  this  
calculation by businessmen will approximate reality  fairly closely over the entire 
period considered when, naturally, the extra profits from innovation
(i.e. from successfully dealing with the sort of uncertainty posited by Knight or 
Schumpeter) are considered as components of price.6
Our formulation,  in  Chapter  3,  of  a  model  of  dynamic  competition that  is 
mainly based on the interaction of innovation, uncertainty and entrepreneurship 
presents  a  simple  specification  in  considering  the  impact  of  innovation  and 
uncertainty on the stock of fixed capital. We express this through an adjustment 
equation to produc-tion, corrected with a term representing the negative impact 
of radical uncertainty on that adjustment. If we substitute for the term production 
in this equation its explanatory variables, we can see the crucial effect on the 
variation  of  the  capi-tal  stock,  entrepreneurship,  profit  rate,  and  hence 
innovation,  and  again  radical  uncertainty.  Thus  we  obtain  a  notion  of  fixed 
capital plainly linked to the critical phenomena that influence it in a dynamic 
economy that is powerfully affected by innovation and uncertainty.
For  its  part,  gross  investment,  considered  as  a  component  of  demand,  is 
explained in the model in Chapter 3 by the variation of net capital stock, plus the 
replacement of the worn capital, plus obsolescence (of existing equipment) due 
to the diffusion of radical innovations concerning capital goods.
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1.2.5 Innovation, endogenous time and the dynamic motion of the  
economy: the cycles of process and product
The exposition that follows is an anticipation of treatment in Chapter 3. Economic 
dynamics is primed by innovation, that is, the introduction into prac-
tice  of  inventions  that  can  be  the  result  of  discoveries  sometimes  made  many 
decades before. But at the present time, invention and innovation are, for the most  
part,  tightly  linked to  each other in the context of the research and development 
practiced by modern firms. Of course, many kinds of innovation may come to light.  
Here  we  limit  ourselves  to  a  main  distinction  which  is  of  a  great  analytical  
importance:  radical innovation,  from time  to time,  gives  rise to  completely  new 
products  as  well  as  to  radically  new organizational  and  technical  processes  and 
hence to an economic and behavioral revolution; incremental innovations, improve 
existing products and processes that accompany the diffusion of the main innova-
tions.7 It may be useful to underline that here the new processes are intended both 
with reference to technical and organizational aspects (that Schumpeter considered 
separately); for its part, the concept of a new product can be extended to include the 
Schumpeterian discovery of new markets. The explanation of innovation must focus 
on  entrepreneurship  and  uncertainty,  as  previously  shown  in  the  treatment  of  
dynamic competition process.
Innovation implies a notion of endogenous time . This differs both from time 
intended as an absolute exogenous variable, in the Kantian sense, and a relative 
variable  in  the  sense  of  Einstein/Minkowski  or  thermodynamics  (Prigogine, 
Georgescu-Roegen). Our endogenous time also differs from the Darwinian evo-
lutionary perspective,  this being an extremely slow natural  mutation-selection 
process that does not show true leaps. The endogeneity of time in this analysis  
may be interpreted  as stating that  a  new time starts  when radical  innovation 
appears. In the formalized and simulated model of Chapter 3, endogenous time 
will  appear  in  the  diffusion,  through  a  logistic  (or  a  Gompertz  function)  of 
radical product innovation, while in the diffusion of radical process innova-tion, 
endogenous time is implicit in the ‘memory’ of a Gamma distribution. The leaps 
caused by the apparition of innovations are formalized through switch functions.
As we noted in the subsections on dynamic competition and uncertainty, the 
entrepreneur’s search for profit is at the heart of the innovative process. In par-
ticular, the push to innovate depends on the persistence of negative profit rates
(innovate  or perish),8 a low degree of radical  uncertainty,  the excess of entrepre-
neurship  and  the  improvements  stimulated  by radical  innovations;  while  product 
innovations are also stimulated by the difficulty of selling the existing products and 
the inequalities  in  income distribution. This will  be formalized in Chapter  3.  An 
important consequence of innovation, that is, breaking the existing equilibrium, is a 
push  of  radical  uncertainty  (to  be  distinguished  by  probabilistic  certainty)  that  
reinforces  the  entrepreneur’s  role.  The  development  process  is  obliged  to  be  an 
entrepreneurial one, both because it cannot do without innovation, its prime mover, 
and because it is obscured by the clouds of radical uncertainty.
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The interaction between innovation, uncertainty and entrepreneurship, in the 
context of the dynamic competition process previously discussed, generates a 
cyclical behavior promoted by the advent of new processes and new products. 
The cycle can be described as follows.
Let us start from a cyclical phase characterized by the stagnation of production,  
low innovation and low uncertainty (since there is no variability of expectations and 
opinions,  they  are  diffusely  and  firmly  negative),  and  hence  a  high  excess  of 
entrepreneurship  (depression).  This  situation  and  the  associated  decline  in  profit 
rates will  favor the use of radical  innovations (innovate or perish) and hence the 
beginning  of  a  recovery  of  production  and  profit  rates.  During  the  depression, 
innovation operates both in the field of process and product; it privileges existing 
industries which can benefit from a more immediate push. But recovery sees a fall in  
the  main  process  innovations  in  existing  industries,  while  the  advent  of  product 
innovation  persists.  The diffusion  of  radical  innovation  and  the  advent  of  incre-
mental innovations following the radical ones will favor expansion, thus opening the 
door to a phase of prosperity. The associated economic expansion markedly reduces 
the  excess  of  entrepreneurship  and  innovation,  leading  toward  a  break  point: 
recession. The consequent decrease in profit rates opens the door to a new phase of  
depression and the excess of entrepreneurship. Such a mechanism is at the heart of 
the so called long waves.9
This cyclical motion is twofold, as distinguished by the adoption of new pro-
ductive forms and techniques, with the associated increases in productivity, and 
the advent of new products, mainly new consumer goods. In parallel, the advent 
of new capital goods will strengthen the achievement of productivity increases.
There exists an important nexus between both kinds of innovations: precisely, 
the advent of new products is pushed and made necessary by the increase in pro-
ductivity due to process innovation; in fact, sooner or later, the demand for the 
existing goods will become insufficient to absorb the productivity increase. Pyka 
and Saviotti10 have pointed out this aspect. But their modeling is partial since it 
does  not  contemplate  process  innovations,  notwithstanding  these  are 
indispensable to cause, through the productivity rise and the deficiency in the 
demand for existing goods, product innovation.
The advent of a new product and its diffusion according to a sigmoid func-
tion (the logistic or Gompertz curve) explain the product cycle that goes through 
the following phases: introduction of the new product in the market; acceleration 
of its demand; maturity, when demand stops growth; decline, when consumers’ 
preferences for the product start to decrease. New products cause the increase of 
uncertainty in the existing sectors of consumer and capital goods. This interferes 
with the process innovations that precede, in some sense, the cycle of consumer 
products and, as previously seen, are promoted by the search for productivity 
increases.
The  formal  model  expressed  in  Chapter  3  will  provide  a  more  stringent 
descrip-tion of the development process in the modern dynamic economies; a 
main pur-pose  is  to  give  some substantial  push  to  the  research  in  this  field 








1.3.1   Some equivocations and omissions of general economics 
Economics has usually disregarded uncertainty. In particular, mainstream
economics has grown as a theory of perfect  knowledge. Coherently with this 
assumption,  it  has  taken  care  to  include  only  casual  events  expressing 
probabilistic certainty (i.e. well-specified probability distributions), while it does 
not  consider  uncertainty,  entrepreneurship,  innovation  or,  in  other  words, 
dynamic competition.
F.H. Knight was the first economist that insisted on the notion of uncertainty; with  
this term, he intended to imply chance rather than a known probability distribu-tion 
and, therefore, something uninsurable and for which cost cannot be provided.
This author insistently underlines that both profit and entrepreneurial function 
are the result of immeasurable uncertainty. That immeasurability is the leitmotif  
of his main work. He writes: “We restrict the use of the term ‘uncertainty’ to 
non quantitative cases. It is this ‘effective’ uncertainty, not risk, as we said, that 
constitutes the base for a correct theory of profit and gives account of the diver-
gences between effective and theoretical competition. . . . The essential principle 
of perfect competition that warrants, in principle, the results toward which effec-
tive competition ‘tends’, is the absence of uncertainty (in the true sense of non 
measurable uncertainty)”.11
We have  seen  that  one  main  task  of  economics  and  businessmen  is  to  get  a 
measure (and explanation) of the degree of uncertainty of expectations. Moreover, 
we shall see in Chapter 6 that it is generally quite easy to measure uncertainty by 
industry  and  size  of  firms.12 Knight  insists  on  the  uniqueness  of  the  events 
representing uncertainty. As we said, a lot of events that are normally insured are 
unique. A theft and a fire are unique events; their grouping by homogeneous classes 
is always rather forced. A road accident is unique as connected to the ability of the 
driver. Notwithstanding, those events are, as a rule, insured.
Knight writes in a note: “If in a particular case uncertainty is measurable, it 
can be substantially eliminated by grouping and consolidating a number of cases 
large enough to warrant certainty with respect to the all group”.13 But we have 
previously seen that firms’ results are not insured because the entrepreneur must 
be charged  with the final  responsibility of  decision making to be induced to 
decide accurately. It seems important to insist on the falsity of Knight’s postu-
late of immeasurability of uncertainty since it has caused great equivocations in 
economic thought, mainly a diffused hostility to (and a denial of) the possibility 
of explaining radical uncertainty, as we shall see later more in detail. For this  
point to be clarified, it must be connected to the notion of dynamic competition 
that, as we know, has uncertainty at center stage. More precisely, it is necessary 
to assert that it is not the immeasurability of uncertainty that causes dynamic 
competition and prevents insurance; the opposite is true: dynamic competition is 
the central feature of the economic process and the engine of economic growth
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and  development,  which  stimulates  uncertainty  and  makes  senseless  the 
insurance of firms’ results.
Knight does not discuss the phenomenon of dynamic competition. At the basis of 
this omission there is a methodological misunderstanding, which is surprising in an 
author who dedicated great attention to method. Precisely, he confuses abstrac-tion, 
necessary to any theoretical development,  with the method of abstract ratio-nality 
typical of logical-formal sciences that use postulates abstracted from reality; as such,  
they may upset the content of reality and lead to absurd formulations. Knight treats 
the theory of perfect knowledge (pure economics) without seeing that the idea of 
perfect knowledge implies a total distortion of reality. He introduces the notion of 
uncertainty  only  to  mitigate  the  hypothesis  of  omniscience,  while  accu-rately 
ignoring the  crucial  phenomenon of  dynamic  competition  as this  is  incon-sistent 
with  the  neoclassical  approach.  He  states  that  the  removal  of  the  hypothesis  of 
perfect  knowledge implies  only some insubstantial  difference with respect  to  the 
neoclassical  model  of  omniscience,  and  that  such difference is  expressed  by the 
appearance of profit  and losses. In sum, he limits  himself  to operating in a neo-
classical  context.  His  insistence  on  uncertainty  represents  an  analytical  advance-
ment, but he refuses to see the irremediable fracture that uncertainty introduces with 
respect  to  neoclassical  theory,  mainly  through  the  correlated  phenomenon  of 
dynamic  competition.  In  effect,  Knight’s  contribution  is  aimed  at  conferring  a 
realistic look to neoclassical economics; in this way, he gets honors and avoids being 
considered  a heretic.  In  effect,  the  ability  to  confer  to  their  strongly unreal-istic 
approach a realistic look through some superficial manipulations is frequent among 
neoclassical students.
But  reality  cannot  be  suppressed.  In  fact,  the  phenomenon  of  uncertainty  soon 
regained a first order position in economics with Keynes’s macroeco-nomic analysis.  
Keynes concentrated on the links among uncertainty, money, long-term expectations 
and  the  connected  volatility  of  investment  and  proved,  on  this  basis,  the 
phenomenon of the deficiency or excess of effective demand.
This led him to show the importance of managing demand in facing the ghost of 
uncertainty. The Second World War, which caused an enormous expansion of 
public expenditure, offered a precious opportunity to prove the usefulness of that 
theory and the associated economic policies.
Neoclassical students quickly integrated Keynes’ teaching into their theories, in 
particular through the Hicksian IS-LM approach that accepts the idea of the non-
neutrality of money. But at the micro level persisted the hegemony of the Walrasian  
theory of general equilibrium, with its pretension to represent the whole economic  
system rigorously  and  in  all  details.  That  persistence  was  strongly  supported  by 
Knight’s teaching on uncertainty. Precisely, the exclusion from microeconomics of 
all  the  crucial  features  of  modern  economies  represented  by  uncertainty,  entre-
preneurship and innovation was considered, on the basis of Knight’s teaching, as an 
admissible  simplification  instead  of  an  unacceptable  distortion  of  reality.  The 
confusion afflicting the method of social thought preserved by substantial
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criticism the majestic futility of the Walrasian theoretical approach. As far as we 
know, nobody has insisted with the due energy (as H. Ekstedt does  14) on the 
basic  mistake  of  general  equilibrium models,  that  is,  their  inspiration  to  the 
method of abstract rationality, typical of logical-formal sciences: a method that 
leads to deduce, from purely nominalist postulates, some precise but useless and 
totally misleading consequences.
Neo-Ricardian criticism has limited itself to show the inconsistency of the neo-
classical aggregate function of production, but this has not affected the substance of 
Walrasian microeconomics.  Indeed,  neo-Ricardian animosity against  neoclassi-cal 
economics  could  not  do  more  since  it  shared  with  the  basic  neoclassical  meth-
odology the method of abstract  rationality,  thus purging theory from uncertainty,  
entrepreneurship,  innovation  and  hence  dynamic  competition,  exactly  like  main-
stream economics does. In effect, neo-Ricardian students have formalized nothing 
more than a simple linear system of prices by industry. This, together with its dual  
counterpart  represented  by  output  equations,  gives  a  general  equilibrium  model 
specified at the industry level and hence is much more limited than neoclassical one. 
Its usefulness only concerns the statistical field.
The previous reference to general equilibrium models cannot omit a consider-
ation  on  von  Neumann’s  system,  representing  another  largely  appreciated 
applica-tion  of  the  abstract  rationality  method.  Von Neumann  substitutes,  to 
neoclassical unreal hypotheses, some others no less unreal (the absence of scarce 
resources, strictly subsistence wages, equal rates of growth by industry); on this  
basis and using the duality relation between output and prices, he calculates a 
vector of prices that, being associated to the highest possible rate of growth, are 
considered to be some best efficiency parameters.
All  these  general  models  of  the  economy share  a  basic  lack:  the  absence  of 
dynamic competition and the corresponding triad, that is, uncertainty, innovation and 
entrepreneurship.  Their  attraction  only  depends  on  them  being  some  brilliant 
mathematical  toys.  The fact  that  the models of perfect  knowledge and stationary 
motion are coherent both with the prevailing method based on observation (and the 
connected hypothesis of repetition of events) and the method of abstract rationality 
has helped their acceptance. But both methods are inappropriate to social real-ity.  
The  acceptance,  by  the  main  economic  schools,  of  the  previously  mentioned 
senseless methodologies has impeded a fruitful debate and the necessary revision.
As is well known, the controversies between classical and neoclassical schools of 
thought were mainly centered on the problem of economic value and exploi-tation, 
and precisely the relations between prices and income distribution. But they did not 
achieve some important advancement in knowledge. What is worse, in such a field 
dominated by resentments and class conflicts, theoretical equivo-cations have caused 
dramatic consequences in practice. In particular, Marxism has associated with the 
fight  against  exploitation  an  extreme  struggle  against  the  entrepreneur  and  the 
market  made  plausible  by  the  diffuse  misconception  of  the  phenomenon  of 
uncertainty. Let us insist on this vicissitude constituting an impor-tant example of 
the absurdities that may be generated by human minds, even the sharpest ones, if  
deviated by methodological misunderstandings.
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The  Marxist  interpretation  of  social  and  historical  process  offers,  notwith-
standing  some serious  errors,15 a  superb  theoretical  monument  if  confronted 
with the analytical poverty of the models sketched previously. Marx draws an 
analysis of capitalism magnifying the role of the market and the bour-geoisie in 
the building of the modern world. Such interpretation could have favored the 
development of a realistic and fecund economic theory, but, on the contrary, it  
has propitiated a real theoretical and operational disaster.
What are the reasons for that?
Marx, as an economist, was strongly influenced by classical thought, but much 
more by Ricardian than Smithian thought. In particular, Marx insisted on the value-
labor theory and hence indicated the market and entrepreneur as major causes of the 
troubles of society and exploitation. He concluded, therefore, that it is neces-sary to 
erase those institutions, as a condition of erasing exploitation.16 Marx’s Das Kapital  
presents some traits of the superb Marxian interpretation of history, particularly in 
the  second  and  third  books  where,  as  a  consequence,  the  sterility  of  Ricardian 
influence becomes evident. He ignores the problem of the concrete organization of 
socialist  systems  that  commit  to  the  ‘imagination  of  history’,  with  his  method 
swinging between naturalism and Hegel’s teaching. But a social order deprived by 
the entrepreneur and the market is obliged to be a centralized social system, like 
‘real socialism’, and hence only suitable to a stationary society, that is, antecedent to 
the stage of a modern dynamic society.
If Marx’s economics had been more influenced by his historical analysis of 
capitalism than by the specifications of classical economists, probably he would 
have perceived the necessity, in modern dynamic societies, of the market and the 
entrepreneurial  role  (even  if  not  necessarily  in  the  form  of  the  capitalist 
entrepreneur). All that should have appeared obvious to a student of historical 
process of Marx’s stature. What is the reason for his misunderstandings on the 
matter? Certainly the arid Ricardo’s teaching was not enough to confuse Marx.
The roots of his mistakes are in his method that blends Darwin’s and Hegel’s  
teachings, a mixture which is disastrous for the analysis of social reality mainly 
because  both these authors  associate  real  with rational,  for  different  reasons, 
despite the importance of reducing, in social reality, the distance between real 
and rational. Marx considered society in Darwinian terms, that is, as result-ing 
from  spontaneous  evolution;  at  the  same  time,  he  considered,  like  Hegel, 
evolution to be able to proceed with rationality and evolve toward paradise on 
earth. This position forbade Marx to think in terms of the organization of social  
systems, that is, to investigate the institutional pillars requested by the general 
conditions of  development  typical  of  each  historical  age.17 In  particular,  this 
prevented him from understanding the importance of the entrepreneur and the 
institutional implications of uncertainty.
Mainstream economics,  which  has  not  been  concerned  with  the  Marxian-
Darwinian-Hegelian methodological wave, has largely used, as previously seen, 
the methods of abstract rationality and observation. Sometimes those method-
ologies operate simultaneously, as it is witnessed by the neo-Ricardian mixtures
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between Marxism and abstract rationalism, as well as by the mixture between 
naturalism and abstract rationality frequent in neoclassical thought.
In this theoretical  landscape, the hypothesis of perfect knowledge and neoclas-
sical economics could consolidate their hegemony without difficulty.  As a conse-
quence, even the controversy on market socialism that occurred between the two 
world wars was almost naturally based on the neoclassical theoretical paradigm. But 
the  versatility  of  the  neoclassical  theoretical  approach  to  incorporating  both 
centralization,  as in E. Barone’s essay ‘The ministry of production in collectivist 
state’,  and  decentralization,  as  in  Lange-Lerner-Taylor’s  decentralized  socialism, 
where a simple rule for decision making substitutes for the entrepreneurial role and 
reveals the total unrealism of the approach. In fact, such a surprising possibility of 
generalization of the model derives  from the fact  that  it  ignores the crucial  phe-
nomena of entrepreneurship, uncertainty and innovation that make up the dynamic  
competition process, so it has nothing to do with reality. It is, therefore, not surpris-
ing that the debate on market socialism gave up in favor of the more realistic and 
useful Keynesian policies that made possible ‘social democratic compromise’. But 
some posthumous resurrection of Barone’s teaching took place in the 1960s and fed 
the  Soviet  Union’s  illusion  to  warrant  the  efficiency  of  its  centralized  economy 
simply using optimization models.
Finally, the total failure of real socialism made clear that its main vice consisted in 
the denial  of some crucial  necessities of modern dynamic economies,  mainly the 
entrepreneur and the market;  it  became clear that  it  was improper and foolish to  
oppose the two in the name of social justice and that such opposition had given rise 
to a system of domination worse than the capitalist one. Unfortunately, the roots of 
wrong institutions and theories cannot be rapidly extirpated; dominating interests 
always act as fierce defenders of them.
The analyses on market forms, mainly perfect and monopolistic competition and 
monopoly,  added  no  clarification  on  the  omissions  and  misunderstand-ings 
discussed,  in  particular  on  the  triad  of  uncertainty,  entrepreneurship  and 
innovation and the notion of dynamic competition. Those static analyses were 
based on the shape of supply-demand curves, with some exception in the studies 
of  oligopoly.  But  it  is  easy  to  see  that  the  earthquake  caused  by  dynamic 
competition  destroys  the  graphical  bases  of  those  theories  on  market  forms. 
Dynamic competition implies, among other things, different prices for identical 
goods  or,  more  precisely,  that  one  source  of  profit  is  the  skill  to  get 
advantageous prices. Besides, dynamic competition implies monopoly prices on 
new  goods  for  the  duration  of  the  degree  of  the  monopoly  deriving  from 
novelties.
Of course, price variations in a competitive  market are caused by the disequi-
libria between supply and demand that drive to the coordination of both. But what  
factors  cause  the  variation  of  the  supply  and  demand  curves?  This  is  the  true 
problem, and it is impossible to solve if the notion of dynamic competition and its  
components – uncertainty, entrepreneurship and innovation – are ignored.
Innovation, uncertainty, entrepreneurship 
19
Post-Keynesian  economics  has  extended  Keynesian  macroeconomics  to 
indus-try level, thus driving economic theory to a higher degree of realism. But 
it does not consider microeconomic level and dynamic competition. The post-
Keynesian attempts to combine Keynes’s, Marx’s and Ricardo’s teachings have 
caused some strong equivocations as a result of that omission.
The vivacious criticism addressed to the Walrasian notion of equilibrium18 has not 
offered some formulation able to remedy what is lacking in mainstream eco-nomics.  
Today, the fragmentation of economics in a variety of schools of thought that are 
unable to interact dominates the scene. Such a fragmented and confused theoretical 
context  has prevented  some important  intuitions  (that  we shall  con-sider  in  next  
paragraphs) to express useful synergies.  In this theoretical  landscape, neoclassical  
economics has been able to preserve the fascination deriving from its pretension to  
give a detailed and coherent representation of economic system. Various students of 
this school of thought have been clever to mask its unreal-ism, both at the macro 
level (e.g. through the models of endogenous growth and the IS-LM approach) and 
at the micro level (e.g. R. W. Clower’s removal of the Walrasian hypothesis that 
transactions take place at equilibrium prices, which has stimulated a proliferation of 
studies on the so-called non-Walrasian equilibrium).
A development even more elegant and innocuous was provided by D. Patinkin by 
introducing money in the Walrasian model of general equilibrium, eliminating (but 
only apparently) the breakage between the monetary and real aspects without vio-
lating the idea of the neutrality of money. For their part, A. Wald, J. von Neumann 
and S. Zeuthen’s contributions warranted the existence of economically meaning-ful 
solutions  (non-negative  output  and  prices)  of  equilibrium  models.  Finally,  the 
theorists of rational expectations have managed to specify a surreptitious form of 
perfect knowledge in spite of radical uncertainty.
So, the neoclassical theory of omniscience, even if based on some absurd pos-
tulates and methods, has succeeded in reinforcing its hegemony through astute 
patchworks and with the help of the errors of opponents. It must be recognized, 
however, that among all schools of economic thought, the neoclassical one is 
distinguished by an admirable coherence. It has been a gymnasium of theoretical 
skills that  may offer  some important  contribution, as soon as a methodology 
more appropriate to economic reality will be defined.
Now consider some formulations that may offer useful elements to build an 
economic theory that is able to bring on to the scene the great absent: dynamic 
competition, to be placed at the center stage of economics.
1.3.2 Important  advancement,  but damaged by the missing link  
between the two faces of dynamic competition: adaptation  
and innovation
As previously seen, Keynes provided, at the macro level, a precious deepening on 
the question of uncertainty. But, in other aspects, this phenomenon has been mis-
understood or neglected, mainly due to the influence of Knight’s analysis that held 
the consideration of uncertainty just as a refinement of the economics of perfect
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knowledge. Nevertheless, the problem of uncertainty was not long in returning to the 
fore and was subject to considerable deepening by G.L.S Shackle and P. Davidson.  
They  insisted  on  crucial  decisions  and  experiments,  the  world  of  order  and 
inspiration, essential novelties and creative events, ergodicity and nonergo-dicity of 
processes, and subjective and objective uncertainty. But the attribution of decisive 
importance to the limits of knowledge and to trial and error processes is to the merit 
of neo-Austrian economics. The students of this school of thought have insistently  
underlined the links between entrepreneurship and uncertainty and the role of the 
market  as  a  mechanism  of  information  and  discovery.  In  particular,  they  have 
insisted on representing economic competition as a result of entrepre-neurial activity 
directed  at  benefiting  from  the  profit  opportunities  engendered  by  disequilibria, 
errors in decision making and the accidents which make economic life uneven. But 
neo-Austrians are responsible for some unilateral exaggerations, in particular Hayek, 
who based an apologia of spontaneous order on the limits of knowledge. He forgets 
that  the  condemnation  of  man  to  advance  by  trial  and  error  implies  that  it  is 
important to find ways of reducing as much as possible the number of errors, mainly  
through interventionism and the building of some organizational forms suitable to 
dynamic reality.
Probably  the  most  enlightening  teachings  on  uncertainty  in  neo-Austrian  eco-
nomics are due to I. Kirzner’s work, mainly his development on ‘market process’.  
He delineates  a  realistic  and  effective,  even  if  incomplete,  representation  of  the 
process of economic production and competition based on entrepreneurial alert-ness 
in taking profit from the opportunities offered by economic reality and the inevitable  
failures of forecasting. Unfortunately, Kirzner’s analysis explains only one half of 
the process of dynamic competition, the one concerning adaptive entre-preneurial 
action directed to take advantage of the existing profit opportunities, which, as we 
saw, tends to erase profit. Kirzner neglects entrepreneurship directed at creating new 
profit opportunities through innovation. Indeed, he makes some attempts to remedy 
this lack by dividing entrepreneurial  process in two compo-nents:  entrepreneurial 
short-run competition  and entrepreneurial  discovery in  the long run.  But Kirzner 
limits  himself  to emphasizing the discovery of the existing opportunities,  not the 
creation of new opportunities.19 He substantially ignores entrepreneurial action that 
engenders  uncertainty  and  disequilibria,  thus  giving  rise  to  arbitrage  and  market 
process. In sum, Kirzner disregards specifying radical innovation or, more generally, 
the dynamic aspect of the competition process, and hence ‘endogenous’ uncertainty.
A promising way to remedy this shortcoming and try to complete the representa-
tion of the dynamic competition process may consist of marrying Kirzner’s market  
process to the Schumpeterian ‘creative destruction’. Unfortunately, neo-Austrian and 
Schumpeterian  teachings  remain  two  separated  branches  of  investigation, 
notwithstanding their strong complementarity. They make two opposite errors: the 
substantial absence of consideration of innovation, which is typical of neo-Austrians, 
and  the  substantial  Schumpeterian  absence  of  consideration  of  uncer-tainty.20 In 
particular, Schumpeter does not attribute any importance to endogenous uncertainty 
that is produced by the economic system, notwithstanding that such
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endogeneity  clearly  springs  off  his  notion  of  ‘creative  destruction’.  This 
omission  has  determined  the  most  surprising  Schumpeterian  error:  the 
forecasting of  the  exhaustion of  entrepreneurial  function21 and the advent  of 
socialism through big business. The error was repeated by J. K. Galbraith in The 
New Industrial State, which diagnosed the convergence between capitalism and 
socialism  through  the  managerial  firm.22 A  superficial  consideration  of 
uncertainty would have been suf-ficient to show the authors the great obstacle 
that such a phenomenon poses to the centralization of decision making.
It is surprising that these two approaches have not been unified so as to supply a 
proper theoretical analysis of the great absent: dynamic competition. The missing 
ring  that  has  prevented  an  effective  and  persuasive  representation  of  a  dynamic 
competition process, starting from the above neo-Austrian and Schumpeterian con-
tributions, is represented by the exclusion from economics of a variable expressing 
the dimension of true or radical uncertainty and the explanation of this. In fact, the 
representation  of  the  interaction  between  innovation  and  adaptation  requires  the 
expression of the endogenous variations of the level  of uncertainty.  Those varia-
tions cause: (a)  the rise of entrepreneurial  adaptive  action when uncertainty (and 
disequilibria) grow together with the connected profit opportunities; and (b) the rise 
of  innovation  when  uncertainty  (and  disequilibria)  decrease  due  to  adaptation 
process, since this decrease will make easier to innovate and will oblige to create 
profit opportunities through innovation. The explanation of the level of uncertainty 
is necessary, and it may allow for unification of neo-Austrian and Schumpeterian 
competition and, in this way, give a more complete and coherent formulation of the 
dynamic  competition  process  and  of  the  explanation  of  entrepreneurship.  The 
mistaken  Knight’s  postulate  of  the  immeasurability  of  uncertainty,  retained  by 
economists with a surprising superficiality, and the connected diffusion of the idea 
that radical uncertainty cannot (and must not) be explained, have obstructed such a 
development.  For better evidence of the persistent separation in economics of the 
two branches of dynamic competition, innovation and adaptation, it may be useful to 
quote the opinion that Kirzner expressed to us on the matter.23 He said:
              I realize, of course (and this was one of the purposes of my ‘Creativity and/  
or  alertness’  paper)  that  there  are  differences  between  the  kinds  of 
innovation Schumpeter had in mind, and the entrepreneurial ‘discoveries’ 
which I had insisted were the steps in the process by which Schumpeter’s  
‘imitators’  tend  to  bring  about  equilibrium.  .  .  .  I  am  reminded  of 
Samuelson’s imagery of the Schumpeterian process as similar to a violin 
string that has been plucked into vibration (by innovation), subsequently 
returning to its quiescent state (through the imitators) – except that you 
postulate  that  the  very  quiescence  of  this  state  stimulates  further 
innovation, etc. . . . You imply that a reduction of uncertainty stimulates 
the rate of Schumpeterian innovation. I have not yet seen any rea-soning 
firmly leading to this conclusion. You seem to take it as obvious.
Yes, it simply is an expression of the search for profit and it is crucial for the 
specification of dynamic competition as given by the interaction of innovation
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and adaptation: when uncertainty and the adaptive opportunities of profit  are  
low, there will be a stimulus to create opportunities of profit through innovation, 
which is easier to introduce in the presence of low uncertainty.
The persistent  lack  of  consideration  of  dynamic  competition  is  surprising. 
This seems to be a result of the absence of a method of social theory appropriate  
to the basic character of social reality. Such a lack condemns economics to offer 
con-fusing  teachings.  These  darken  even  the  most  obvious  and  elementary 
problems  through  complicated  and  misleading  formulations,  with  everybody 
claiming to be right in their own way. The next subsection will consider some 
equivocations that affect the strong opposition of heterodox economics to the 
economics of perfect knowledge.
1.3.3 The exaggerated success of the notion of bounded rationality  
and the associated attack on optimization
The  aversion  to  the  economics  of  perfect  knowledge  has  grown  with  the 
accelera-tion of economic dynamics and hence the rise of uncertainty. In such an 
intellectual climate, the notion of ‘bounded rationality’ has come to light and has 
enjoyed  rapid  success  due  to  its  usefulness  in  opposing  neoclassical  perfect 
rationality. Unfortunately, that notion is undermined by numerous equivocations 
that need to be clarified.
In  every  field  of  life,  man  is  forced  to  go  ahead  by  trial  and  error.  The 
understanding of nature is made difficult by the fact that such reality is not the 
work  of  man.  On  the  contrary,  the  understanding  of  social  reality  is  made 
difficult by the fact that it is a result of the interaction of a lot of human actions 
and  creative  events.  But  this  difficulty  is  better  expressed  by  the  terms 
uncertainty or  limited knowledge  than by the expression ‘bounded rationality’. 
In effect, human skills and rationality are always bound, by definition, to the 
limits of human knowledge.
An interesting definition may consist in the notion of ‘cognitive rationality’  
that underlines the learning process connected to the use of human rationality.24 
This  process  requires  a  measure  of  the  degree  of  uncertainty to  express  the 
formation and use of entrepreneurial skills and to define the constraints of the 
cognitive process, as we shall soon see.
It must be recognized that the notion of bounded rationality has promoted some 
useful deepening of cognitive processes, in conjunction with M. Polanyi’s research 
on ‘tacit knowledge’. Unfortunately, that notion almost neglects the dynamic com-
petition process although this represents the backbone of the economic process in the 
presence  of  limited  knowledge.  What  is  more  surprising  in  the  economics  of 
bounded rationality is that it does not seem to understand the crucial importance of 
considering the level (and hence a measure) of the factor on which the lim-its of  
rationality  depend,  that  is,  the  degree  of  radical  uncertainty.  This  omission  has 
implied  the denial  or  the  darkening of  the  possibility  to  explain  uncertainty  and 
suffocates the potentiality of this branch of heterodox economics; it prevents, as just 
seen with reference to neo-Austrian and Schumpeterian teachings, the
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formalization of the phenomenon of dynamic competition. It seems, therefore, sen-
sible to ask to the growing number of students insisting on the notion of bounded 
rationality:  What  prevents  you  from seeing  the  importance of  a  measure  and  an 
explanation of the factor expressing the limitation of rationality, that is, the level of 
uncertainty? The economists who insist on bounded rationality disregard the ques-
tion of the accuracy of expectations. But their negligence in producing a measure 
and an explanation  of  the  volatility  or  variability  of  expectations  is  a  surprising 
omission. This volatility is, at the same time, perfectly coherent with the notion of 
bounded rationality and gives a possible measure of the degree of uncertainty.
The galaxy of theories constituting the so-called heterodox economics testifies to 
an enormous analytical  fragmentation that  prevents the unification of efforts  and 
results. One of the few aspects shared by heterodox students is the disputation with 
mainstream  economics.  But  this  convergence  is  afflicted  by  exaggerations  and 
equivocations.  In  particular,  the  disputation  has  obscured,  mainly  through  some 
abuse of the expression ‘bounded rationality’, the important fact that man is obliged, 
by his interests and competition, to use his rational skills, just like the opti-mization 
procedure maintains. It has been erroneously assumed that optimization presumes 
omniscience,  an  assumption  that  indeed  would  imply  that  Pontryagin’s  and 
Kantorovich’s  works  are  pointless.  Kirzner  wrote:  “Where  the  circumstances  of 
decision are believed to be certainly known to the decision-maker, we can ‘pre-dict’ 
what form that decision will take merely by identifying the optimum course of action 
relevant  to  the  known  circumstances.  Now  this  ‘mechanical’  interpretation  of 
decision-making would be entirely acceptable for a world of perfect knowledge and 
prediction”.25 This  assimilation  of  optimization  to  neoclassical  economics  is 
mistaken.  Optimization  does not require  perfect  knowledge;  it  is  only a  tool  for 
decision making that often is more rational than others. Perhaps it would be much 
more enlightening to hinge the polemics against neoclassical thought on the notion 
of uncertainty than on that of bounded rationality.
The father of bounded rationality, H. Simon, opposed to optimization the prin-
ciple  of  ‘satisfying  behavior’.  But  this  principle  is  vague  and  can  be  variously 
interpreted, mainly with reference to the levels of aspiration and satisfaction.
All seems to show that the hostility against  optimization is mainly due to two 
prejudices: (1) the habit of connecting the optimization principle to the hypothesis of 
omniscience,  that  is,  perfect  knowledge,  thus  forgetting  that  such  a  principle  is 
simply a mathematical tool that does not need that hypothesis; and (2) the postulate  
of  immeasurability  and  unexplainability  of  uncertainty,  that  is,  the  denial  of  the 
possibility of defining an endogenous variable expressing the degree of limitation of 
knowledge; this denial prevents the possibility of formalizing an optimization model 
including both uncertainty and the availability of entrepreneurial skills and hence the 
tension in the use of these. In fact, to define availability and tension, a measure and 
an explanation of the degree of uncertainty are needed.
Firms are forced by competition, more than other subjects, to act  rationally as  
much as possible. This implies that firms’ competition drives them to optimization; 
but this only means that optimization gives better solution than other procedures. In 
sum, an aprioristic refusal of optimization is not wise, this being able to supply a
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better rationality criterion than other decision-making tools. All that is quite simple 
and evident.  The main reason obscuring this banal evidence is (let  us repeat) the 
conviction that uncertainty is something impalpable and, as such, is inconsistent with 
optimization; this conviction leads to intend optimization as only referable to the 
absurd  hypothesis  of  perfect  information.  The  result  is  that,  while  neoclas-sical 
economists  tend  to  strongly  exaggerate  human  knowledge  on  the  basis  of  the 
hypothesis of perfect knowledge, their opponents make an opposite exaggeration: 
the postulate of immeasurability  and unexplainability of uncertainty that prevents 
obtaining important knowledge and urgent analytical development.
1.3.4  An ambivalence afflicting the potentialities of economic  
and institutional evolutionary thought: entrepreneurial  
skills and decisional routines
The notion of evolution strongly influences the modern economic thought and 
the analysis  of institutions, in connection with the insistence on the limits of 
knowl-edge or radical uncertainty. Unfortunately, the use by economics of the 
evolution-ary metaphor is afflicted by ambivalence. From the one side, Hayek 
and neo-Austrians underline the limitation of knowledge as a support to the idea 
that  economic  processes  and  the  evolution  of  institutions  are  the  result  of 
spontane-ous  behavior;  as  a  consequence,  they  strongly  dislike  the 
organizational view of method, to which they oppose ‘spontaneous order’, and 
hence they are inclined to neglect  the problem of the firm. On the contrary,  
institutional  students  emphasize  organization  and  utilize  the  notion  of 
uncertainty to explain institutions and, hence, the firm.
To understand these aspects,  some consideration of  Nelson and Winter’s  con-
tribution may be useful.26 The development  of  these  authors is  mainly based on 
Schumpeterian work; this has prevented, for the reasons indicated previously, the 
adequate representation of the dynamic competition process, which should be at the 
center stage of heterodox economics. Nelson and Winter’s analysis shows, however,  
some differences with respect to Schumpeter that must be noted.
Evolutionary economics does not neglect uncertainty, but it incorporates it in the 
notion  of  bounded  rationality  and  considers  unquestionable  the  postulate  of 
immeasurability of (and the impossibility to explain) uncertainty. Unfortunately, this 
postulate, and the consequent setting aside of the optimization principle, engender a 
vague  theoretic  atmosphere.  Evolutionary  economics’  main  remedy  to  that 
vagueness is the notion of ‘decisional routines’,  which are intended to provide a  
solid  conceptual  basis  to  decision  making;  some  evolutionary  econo-mists  have 
assimilated  decisional  routines  to  biological  genes.  Here  it  appears  again:  the 
methodological inappropriateness of the postulate of immeasurability of uncertainty.  
In fact, it  is mainly due to that postulate that this branch of economics separates  
entrepreneurial function from uncertainty in the context of the notion of routine. But 
the various developments on routines do not provide stringent empiri-
                        cal and conceptual formulations;27 they presume some very simple decisional rules 
emphasizing the automaticity of decision making, but this is inconsistent with the 
entrepreneurial role and hence does not allow the explanation of entrepreneurship.
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Nelson and Winter  intend routines  as  organizational  memories,  as forms of tacit 
knowledge, in M. Polanyi’s sense. They consider routines to be the most important 
storage  of  organizational  knowledge.  The  firm’s  behavior  should  be  explained 
through the used routines, and it should be expected that in the future the firm will  
behave  similarly  to  the  past,  the  change  in  routines  being  obstructed  by  the 
consequent  fracture  of  equilibrium  and  organizational  compromises.  However, 
innovation in the rules of decision making is considered possible and important. But 
entrepreneurship  is  inconceivable  and  inexplicable  if  separated  by  radical 
uncertainty.  It  must be stressed that the notion of routine has nothing to do with 
entrepreneurship.  Entrepreneurship  is  mainly  a  skill  to  meet  uncertainty,  while 
routine means repetition and hence implies bureaucratic skills. Heterodox analy-ses 
have dedicated a good deal of work to organizational skills, but they say very little  
on entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurial decisions, at least the most important of them, 
do not follow any precise rules. The various branches of heterodox econom-ics, in 
trying to reduce, through the notion of routine, the indeterminacy deriving from the 
notion  of  bounded  rationality  and  from  the  postulate  of  immeasurability  of 
uncertainty, forget the flexibility and versatility of entrepreneurship. M. Egidi and A. 
Narduzzo have empirically shown that the use of routines that were effec-tive in the 
past may cause systematic decisional errors.28 It is our opinion that the analytical 
indeterminacy of entrepreneurial decisions cannot be faced through the reference to  
some  precise  decisional  rules;  it  requires  ventures  in  uncertainty,  where 
entrepreneurship acts.  More precisely,  it  is  important to  define some criteria  that 
allow for measuring and explaining the level of radical uncertainty and its variations, 
so as to provide both a more solid basis to decision making and some analytical  
developments on the formation and the use of entrepreneurial skills; on innovation, 
disequilibria and adaptation, in brief, on the dynamic competition process.
It must be noted, however, that the growing attention dedicated to uncertainty and 
to  the  limits  of  knowledge  has  stimulated,  among  evolutionary  students  and  in  
opposition  to  spontaneous  evolutionism,  some  interesting  developments  on 
organization, mainly in the field of the firm. We saw that uncertainty requires some 
peculiar  institutional  forms.  In  this  light,  it  is  relevant  that  the  firm  has  been 
indicated, by the economists  of ‘transaction costs’,  as an organizational necessity 
since it reduces uncertainty due to those costs by introducing hierarchical com-mand 
mechanisms  to  the  market.  This  theory  is  important,  but  it  explains  less  than 
supposed, mainly on the firm dimension. In fact, the increase in the sizes of firms  
reduces the  market  transactions  and hence the  uncertainty caused  by the  incom-
pleteness of corresponding contracts.  Moreover,  the bureaucratization of decision 
making in large firms reduces the capabilities to face the unknown. Of course, it is 
possible to remedy that inconvenience through decentralized organizational forms, 
but this possibility is opposed by the centralization of last instance responsibility.  
Besides, the strategies devoted to reducing uncertainty are weakened and opposed by 
the fact that entrepreneurial innovation engenders uncertainty.
The dimensions of the firm seem mainly influenced by the quality and quantity of 
available entrepreneurial skills and uncertainty, which determine the potentialities
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of those skills and their demand. In conclusion, the best way to treat radical or 
true uncertainty seems to be introducing explicitly it into the models for decision 
making  so  as  to  estimate  its  impact  on  strategic  choices  and  some  other 
important  variables,  rather  than setting uncertainty  aside  on the  basis  of  the 
hypothesis that it cannot be measured and explained.
Neoclassical students, with the purpose to improve the realism of their theories,  
have suggested introducing into optimization models the skill to face uncertainty. 
But this idea and the others concerning uncertainty need a variable expressing their 
levels,  a  possibility  denied  by  the  postulate  of  immea-surability  (and 
nonexplanation)  of  radical  uncertainty.  Such  a  postulate  seems  to  represent  a 
principal obstacle to the building of an economic theory that is able to conjugate  
uncertainty,  entrepreneurship and innovation and an obstacle  to defining the way 
uncertainty influences (and is influenced by) entrepreneurship and innova-tion. The 
representation  of  the  dynamic  competition  process  and  economic  devel-opment 
requires  the  abolition  of  that  postulate.  There  exists  a  tight  link  between 
entrepreneurial skill and uncertainty; in fact, in the absence of radical uncertainty,  
there would be no need for (and no formation of) entrepreneurship. As the notion of 
dynamic competition shows, the entrepreneur meets uncertainty, but also gener-ates 
uncertainty, through innovation.
         Entrepreneurial  capabilities  are  mainly  a  result  of  tacit  knowledge 
(learning  by  doing,  by  watching  and  by  using)  and  innate  skills.  These 
capabilities vary, there-fore, with experience. It follows that, even if one main 
characteristic of them is versatility, the operational experience confers to skills  
some degree of specializa-tion that restricts their field of competence. 
    Darwinian evolution cannot be referred to the interpretation of economic 
and  social  events.  Such  interpretation  needs  an  organizational  view  to  may 
consider the growing pace of economic and social change, while the extremely 
low change concerning the advent of new animal species allows, in biology, the 
use  of  the  observational  view.  However,  after  the  elimination  of  the 
misunderstandings  considered in this section, the combination of  institutional 
and evolutionary thought seems to offer a fecund methodological perspective for 
the study of social events. In fact, the institutional character of human societies 
decisively influence the pace of their evolutionary change and, for its part, the 
sedimentation of changes determines the necessity to edify,  in the context of 
changing general  conditions of development, of new institutions. So that, the 
importance of the institutional aspect side by side with the evolutionary motion 
appears evident and concerns also ethical aspect. In this regard, see chapter 2 
section 2 on the role of  ontological  imperatives  (often  of  ethical  content)  in 
pushing  the  evolutionary  motion,  and  the  role  of  functional  imperatives  in 
providing  the  institutions  required  by  the  changing  general  conditions  of 
development.
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1.3.5  Some limitations of econometrics and the definition of a  
measure of uncertainty
In  the last  50 years,  sophisticated econometric  methods have been developed, 
sometimes  using  some  impressing  mathematical  techniques.  A  dominating 
convic-tion is  that  those methodologies  are  able to express  some universally 
valid results. But the opposite is true.
In general,  econometric estimations may be referred only to the past or, more 
precisely, to the considered observation period, not to the future. Some limited 
and cautious application to the future may be justified if there exist reasons to 
think that the considered phenomena are long lasting. But how does one prove 
this property of phenomena? An important way to do that may be to determine if 
they result from the existing general conditions of development. In this case, the 
high  durability  characterizing  those  conditions  should  warrant  a  parallel 
durability of the corresponding phenomena, these being an expression of those 
conditions of development that impose corresponding organizational structures 
for reasons of coherence and efficiency. Well, dynamic competition and its con - 
stituent  triad,  that  is,  uncertainty,  entrepreneurship  and  innovation,  are  basic 
durable aspects of modern dynamic economies. Even if the parameters resulting 
from the connected estimation may vary over time, those variations do not
destroy the explanatory power of the estimated relations. But statistical data do 
not  exist  on  these  variables.  This  prevents  us  from  making  econometric 
estimations about them, as we shall see in the modeling outlined in Chapters 3 
and 4, where we have been obliged to restrict our analysis to simulations, since 
econometric  estimations  are  prevented  by  the  absence  of  statistical  data  on 
entrepreneurship, innovation and radical uncertainty. In particular, the dominant 
conviction as to the impossibility of providing a measure of radical uncertainty 
completely voids the question of the availability of data on this variable. But we 
have  seen  in  Section  1.2  that  the  idea  of  nonmeasurableness  of  radical 
uncertainty is completely wrong.
To get ahold of the ghost of uncertainty, more than one quantitative indicator of 
this variable must be defined. As we shall see extensively in Chapter 6, we have  
specified  and  tested  three  criteria  of  measure.  One  has  been  derived  from  the 
European Union - Institute of Studies for Economic Analysis (EU-ISAE) surveys on 
business tendency and consists  of the measure of the variability over time of the 
answers,  that  is,  the  volatility  of  the  opinions  (concerning  the  expectations  on 
delivery orders, production, prices and cost of financing and liquidity assets) of each 
firm  of  the  utilized  sample.  Another  indicator  has  been  provided  through the 
inclusion of an opposite question on uncertainty in an ISAE survey for some recent  
quarterlies  starting  from  April  2004;  another  measure  of  uncertainty  could  be 
derived  from  the  deviations  between  expectations  and  results  in  the  EU-ISAE 
surveys. A peculiar indicator of uncertainty may be given by the standard deviation  
of profit rates across firms; in fact, in the absence of uncertainty and of institutional 
monopolies,  profit (and hence its standard deviation across firms) would be zero. 
Differentials  in capabilities  and the associated profits  are conceivable only in the 
presence of limits to knowledge (true uncertainty); for this reason, the variance of 
profit rates across firms may be intended as an expression of the limits of knowl-
edge and hence of uncertainty.
Some other indicators of uncertainty may be the specification of a minimum-
maximum range of expectations, with the distance between the minimum and 
maximum expectation that may be considered as an expression of the degree of 
uncertainty. Also the standard deviation (i.e. the distribution about the means) of 
foresights may be interpreted as a measure of uncertainty.
As is well known, uncertainty displays some very important effects on irre -  
vocable choices and hence on investment. In order to improve the explanation 
of investment, some studies29 have proposed specifying the laws (or costs) of 
learning in getting information on decisions that are postponed, so that to may 
estimate  the  convenience  of  postponing  the  decisions  to  invest.  But  the 
hypotheses concern-ing those laws and costs are, in general, scarcely realistic. 
Uncertainty  discour-ages  investment  in  a  different  and  more  direct  way. 
Precisely, high uncertainty suggests the postponement of investment for at least 
two reasons: (1) waiting for a more serene atmosphere and (2) increase in the 
use of entrepreneurial skills in ordinary activities, requested by the increase in 
turbulences.  This  makes  the  degree  of  uncertainty  an  important  explanatory 
variable  of  invest-ment.  Unfortunately,  econometric  estimations  using  some 
proper  indicators  of  the  degree  of  uncertainty  are  rare.  We  dedicate  much 
attention to uncertainty in Chapter 6.
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1.4 Conclusion
This chapter points out that one main deficiency of economic thought is the lack of 
consideration  of  dynamic  competition  processes  that  are  hinged  upon  entre-
preneurship,  innovation  and  uncertainty.  This  aspect  is  completely  neglected  by 
mainstream economics. Only three schools of thought have dedicated some useful  
considerations to the phenomenon. Two of them, neo-Austrian and Schumpeterian, 
are strongly complementary: the first emphasizes uncertainty and entrepreneur-ship, 
but almost ignores innovation, while the second emphasizes the entrepreneur-ial role 
and innovation but neglects uncertainty. These omissions prevent the two schools of 
thought adequately developing the notion of dynamic competition. We have seen 
that the assumption of immeasurability of uncertainty and the associ-ated denial of  
its explanation, which are explicit in neo-Austrians (Kirzner’s ‘fog of uncertainty’) 
and implicit in Schumpeter, prevents an adequate treatment of the formation and use 
of  entrepreneurship  and  the  innovation-adaptation  process,  hence  economic 
development. Moreover, the assumption of immeasurability of uncertainty and the 
emphasis on the limits of knowledge have diffused the mis-taken conviction that the 
maximization principle is only applicable to the neoclas-sical economics of perfect 
knowledge.
The equivocations we are stressing are shared by heterodox economics, which 
insists on the notion of ‘bounded rationality’. Indeed, this notion has amplified 
the  misunderstandings  provoked  by  the  assumption  of  immeasurability  and 
unex-planability  of  uncertainty.  This  is  clearly  evident  in  evolutionary 
economics, the third school of thought that embodies some aspects of dynamic 
competition. Such a school (following Schumpeterian thought) has, at its heart, 
innovation and emphasizes the limits of knowledge as expressed by the notion 
of bounded rationality.  Unfortunately,  this notion is rather ambiguous; human 
rationality is always bounded, but this does not deny that decision making must 
make an effort to use reason at its best, as the optimization approach attempts to 
do. Nevertheless, heterodox economics rejects optimization.
Evolutionary economics tries to remedy some theoretical vacuity arising from 
the limitations mentioned through the notion of ‘decisional routines’. But this 
notion is far from clear. In particular, it refers to a kind of skill that has nothing 
to do with entrepreneurship since it postulates repetitive, bureaucratic decision 
making, while a main characteristic of entrepreneurial skills is versatility and 
flex-ibility.  Evolutionary  economics  is  also  afflicted  by  various 
misunderstandings on dynamic competition, even if for theoretical reasons it is 
partly different from neo-Austrian and Schumpeterian thought.
In sum, the crucial phenomenon represented by dynamic competition, when is 
not disregarded altogether,  is treated in a partial and misleading way without 
properly considering entrepreneurship, uncertainty and innovation. This chapter 
has tried to remedy these drawbacks.
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Notes
1 It  has  been  fully  developed  in  A.  Fusari,  Methodological  Misconceptions  in  the  
Social Sciences (Springer, 2014).
2 See A. Fusari (1996a).
3 With the exception of its exogenous part depending, for instance, on natural events.
4 When a better technology is invented, the old production processes must adapt to the 
prices imposed by the new one. At this point, if those prices no longer enable old 
producers  to  amortize  the  costs  of  their  plants  and  the  latter  cannot  be  fully 
depreciated, the businesses with obsolete technology will have losses. There will also 
be  losses  if  the  new  prices  only  permit,  for  the  remaining  physical  life  of  the 
equipment,  amortization  rates  lower  than would  be  necessary to  fully  recoup the 
investment.
5 Thus their analysis is not particularly suitable for explaining the efficiency of choices  
made in different social and institutional contexts.
6 If depreciation was systematically overestimated (and thus overcharged), this would 
introduce an arbitrary element of extra profit. If, on the other hand, depreciation was  
systematically underestimated, it would introduce a systematic factor of loss. But this 
cannot happen, due to competition.
7 The distinction between radical and incremental innovations, frequent in economics, 
is  for  the most  part  not  rigorous.  It  needs a  precise  expression  of  the  degree  of 
importance of innovations.
 The degree of importance of a new consumer product can be represented by the quantity 
of its production (the conquered market as expressed by the superior asymptote of the  
logistic) at the end of the diffusion period and by the substitution and comple-mentary 
effects of the new product on the existing consumer goods.
 The degree  of importance of a  capital  product  innovation may be expressed by the 
superior asymptote of the logistic and the parameters indicating the stimulating effects of  
the new capital products on process innovation.
 Finally, the degree of importance of process innovations is represented by the leap in  
productivity that they cause.
8 See Mensch (1979).
9 See Fusari and Reati (2013).
10 See Pyka and Saviotti (2004).
11 See F. H. Knight (1950), pp. 18 and 19.
12 See A. Fusari (2006).
13 See F. H. Knight (1950), p. 165.
14 See Ekstedt and Fusari (2010).
15 See A. Fusari (1996a).
16 The generic attribution of production to labor is pointless since production largely 
results from human creativity.  Another thing is the statement that the fruits of the 
natu-ral lottery of talents must be for the benefit  of the whole society,  but paying  
attention to not obstruct creativeness, as we shall see in Chapter 11.
17 See (Fusari 2014).
18 Kaldor wrote: “In effect, the theory of (general) equilibrium has reached a stage of  
development  characterized by the fact  that pure theorists have succeeded (even if  
unconsciously)  to  prove  the impossibility  that  the  implications  of  that  theory are  
empiri-cally true” (cited in D’Antonio 1975, p. 77).
19 Kirzner  writes:  “To  understand  development  it  is  necessary  to  understand  the 
entrepre-neurial  process  whereby  opportunities  that  where  hitherto  existent  but 
unseen become opportunities seen and exploited” (Kirzner 1985, p. 74).
20 Schumpeter very much admired the Walrasian model of general equilibrium: “Magna
Charta of economics . . . enormous research program . . . the base of the best work of  
our time”. See Schumpeter (1972), pp. 482 and 556.
30   Theoretical frame
21 Schumpeter writes: “The giant industrial unit, perfectly bureaucratised . . . supplants  
the entrepreneur” (Schumpeter 1977, p. 130).
22 Galbraith says: “Nothing is today more interesting than to see that the entity previously 
known as capitalist  firm and that previously known as socialist  firm begin to resemble 
under the oligarchic direction of technostructure” (Galbraith 1968, p. 343).
23 Private correspondence dated 7 December 2006.
24 See Morroni (2005).
25 See Kirzner (1973), pp. 33 and 37.
26 See Nelson and Winter (1982).
27 See Becker (2001).
28 See Egidi and Narduzzo (1997).
29 See Pindyck (1991) and Ulph and Ulph (1994).
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Abstract of Chapter 2
In  this  chapter  we  extend  and  deepen  the  critical  content  of  the  previous 
chapter,  making  specific  reference  to  those  particular  doctrines  that  have 
fanned the flames of heated disputes between the so-called mainstream and 
heterodox schools of economics. We first bring to light some considerations 
on  the  method  of  social  science,  and  explain  why  methodological 
misunderstandings have damaged the explanatory potential  of various rival 
theories. In the last part of the chapter we advance some ideas as to the best 
ways  of  overcoming  those  misconceptions  that  are  widespread  in  current 
economics,  thereby advancing the construction of an alternative theoretical 
edifice built upon more scientific ground.
              Abstract of Chapter 3
This  chapter  specifies  a  model  able  to  represent  at  the maximum level  of 
sectoral  disaggregation  (a  sector  for  each  good)  the  production  and 
accumulation process typical of modern dynamic economies. The mechanism 
driving the evolutionary motion of the economy is based on the interactions 
between  innovation,  uncertainty  and  entrepreneurship.  The  relationship 
between the proposed mechanism, the connected cycles, and the explanation 
for each one of those variables, which are often treated as exogenous, merits 
great  attention.  We  insist  that  the  innovation-adaptation  (or  structural 
organization) process expresses the phenomenon of dynamic competition, and 
we point  out  that  it  also allows some instructive description of  social  and 
historic processes.  In this matter the current economic theories show a real 
and, let us say, inevitable impotence. 
Abstract of Chapter 4
In this chapter the analysis is extended to the micro level, thereby providing 
for a more complete representation of the economic process as a whole, and 
bringing to light  in particular entrepreneurial  action. This chapter  brings to 
light  the  great  gulf  between  our  construction  and  that  of  the  Walrasian 
approach, highlighting the explanatory poverty of the latter. Initially, we show 
a model characterized only by adaptation, which as such suggests a suicide of 
entrepreneurship.  Then  we  consider  the  complete  model,  in  which  the 
entrepreneur practices innovation as well as adaptation. The complete model 
thus  expresses  the  whole  substance  of  the  phenomenon  of  dynamic 
competition.
 
Abstract of Chapter 5
In  order  to  provide  a  more  complete  analysis  of  the  micro  level,  we pay 
attention  in  this  chapter  to  the  question  of  the  firm  considered  in  close 
connection with the phenomenon of radical  uncertainty.  Some of the main 
issues in the dense debate over the firm are set out and criticized, most notably 
the  controversy  between  those  who,  distrusting  organization  and  favoring 
spontaneous motion, tend to pass over the significance of the firm, and those 
concerned with the evolution of institutions,  who see the firm as a crucial  
economic institution.
     Some clarification of the optimization approach with regard to the firm’s 
decision making is also set out. It is shown that the controversies that surround 
this issue are motivated in general by an opposition to the neoclassical school, 
and in particular by that school’s misuse of the notion of uncertainty.  This 
misuse  gives  rise  to  the  bounded  rationality  criticism of  the  optimization 
approach.
     The chapter also offers some reflections upon the problem of the size of the 
firm. An analysis of the limitations of and stimulantes to dimensional growth 
is  undertaken.  We also  discuss  the  objective  or  institutional  nature  of  the 
factors counteracting the boundaries to a firm’s dimensions, thereby obtaining 
knowledge of the degree of inevitableness of the dimensional growth of the 
firm – itself an important factor influencing the forms of competition.
Abstract of Chapter 6
This  chapter  treats  one  of  the  most  elusive  and,  in  a  sense,  mysterious 
phenomenon  troubling  both  economists  and  economic  operators:  radical 
uncertainty.  We  first  clarify  the  difference  between  expectations  and 
uncertainty, with the former expressing the attempt to penetrate the inherent  
vagueness of the future, but the latter providing an expression of the degree of 
ignorance  on  future  events.  The  importance  of  measuring  the  variable  of 
uncertainty at sectoral level is insisted on, with the profits of BTS (Business 
Tendency Surveys)  enabling  the  definition  of  various  indicators  of  radical 
uncertainty.  Finally,  the  chapter  formalizes  and  estimates  a  simple  model 
based on the interaction between uncertainty and innovation, examines the 
connected  business  cycle,  and  presents  the  econometric  estimations  of  the 
model for Italy, the United Kingdom, France and Germany that indicate some 
differences between these countries in the operation of the phenomenon of 
dynamic competition.
Abstract of Chapter 7
This chapter inaugurates the passage from the theoretical side of our work to 
the  reformations  it  implies  or  suggests  and  to  the  questions  of  political 
economy more generally.  Specifically,  we now combine our account of the 
process of dynamic competition, and the cyclical motion it implies, with the 
notion  of  particular  historical  phases  of  development;  a  combination 
disregarded by current economics and yet essential if we are to understand the 
changing  character  over  time  of  growth  processes  and  cycles.  Our  earlier 
treatment  of  institutions  now  facilitates  a  distinction  between  different 
historical phases as well as a perception of the circumstances of their advent. 
This supplies us with important knowledge concerning the basic contents of 
present and future ages as well as the changes over time of cyclical behavior. 
On such a basis we may trace an important and peculiar ‘time arrow’ in the 
generation  of  the  economy:  with  the  general  conditions  of  development 
change  those  basic  institutions  that  we  denominate  functional  imperatives, 
which in turn causes the advent of new historical phases with corresponding 
organizational necessities – that is to say, a new world, the content of which 
we  are  able  to  perceive  despite  the  unpredictable  events  that  propel  and 
characterize economic dynamics. 
Abstract of Chapter 8
This  chapter  is  dedicated  to  a  theme  that  has  generated  substantial 
misunderstandings and yet long been a great source of inspiration for political 
economy,  namely,  Keynesian  and  post-Keynesian  assumptions  as  to  the 
leading  role  of  demand  in  the  economy  and  the  definition  of  economic 
policies. As is well known, for over thirty years the Keynesian interpretation 
has constituted an important  teaching able to promote high growth rates in 
developed countries. The chapter points out the appropriateness of demand led 
modeling in the phase of monopoly capitalism, which is characterized by high 
profits, low wages and unstable expectations that hold investment back well  
below profits, thereby causing a systematic deficiency of effective demand. 
But as we proceed to underline, such compatibility is far less apparent in more 
recent  ages,  which  therefore  demand  an  attempt  to  delineate  a  political 
economy more appropriate to newer phases of development. Nevertheless, the 
chapter shows that exposition of the conditions required by the functioning of 
Keynesian  economics  provides  a  useful  exercise  in  understanding  the 
requirements  of  completely  different  phases  of  development.  For  such 
understanding, the combination of the dynamic competition processes and the 
corresponding cyclical mutations, with the notion of phase of development, is 
very valuable.
Abstract of Chapter 9
We  begin  this  chapter  by  noting  how,  in  underdeveloped  and  dualistic 
economies,  the operation of  bottlenecks  and diffused disequilibria prevents 
demand led policies from stimulating growth and development. We then point 
out  that  a  main  cause  of  the  failure  of  Italian  economic  planning  was  its 
demand led nature and mistaken pretense of overcoming dualism through a 
programmatic approach. The chapter presents a formal dualistic model of the 
economy aimed at expressing some of the main traits of the Italian economy 
of that  time. An econometric  estimation of the model is provided, together 
with stability and sensitivity analysis and an enhancement of the in-sample 
predictive performance of the model.
 Abstract of chapter 10
This chapter identifies some important monetary and financial variables and 
examines  their  changing  role  over  the  course  of  different  phases  of 
development and cyclical behavior. We pay attention, first of all, to money, 
highlighting  its  peculiar  role  in  the  phase  of  monopoly  capitalism, 
characterized as it is by a chronic deficiency of effective demand.
     We then turn to the controversy between Keynesians and monetarists, and 
point  out  the  inappropriateness  of  both  interpretations  to  the  phase  of 
consumeristic capitalism. We underline the importance, for the understanding 
of this phase, of the notion of ‘nominal demand of money’ and argue that, in 
the absence of money illusion, this endogenous character of money stimulates 
inflation and public debt.
     The chapter then turns to the advent of the phase of financial capitalism,  
characterized by the dominance of international  finance capital  on a global 
scale,  and  points  out  that  the  inappropriateness  of  both  Keynesian  and 
monetarist interpretations is now exacerbated. But the full treatment of this 
point, as is pointed out, must be preceded by an analysis of interest rate, a 
main variable in the life and action of financial capital. We show that interest  
rate is an exogenous variable with little to do with the equilibrium between the 
supply and demand of capital, an unnecessary and pernicious variable at the 
heart  of  widespread  speculation,  which  could  be  abolished  through  legal 
prohibition on a global scale.
     The notion and the contents  of  phases  of  development  are  of crucial 
importance if we are to be able to delineate the basic reformations needed 
over the course of life of economic systems. A key step in satisfying such a 
need is a sound proposal concerning the organization of financial markets that 
aims to eliminate the domination of financial capital that is characteristic of 
the current phase of financial capitalism. Thus the final section of the chapter  
attempts to depict a national and international financial  order not enslaving 
production but is rather at its service.
Abstract of Chapter 11
This chapter turns to the ethical dimension, primarily in relation to questions 
of social justice when combined with the operation of freedom and creativity. 
In  other words,  we consider here the functional  need to combine diversity, 
which is essential to the expression of creativity, and social justice, which is  
essential  to  the  extraction of  the  creative  skills  that  are  casually  dispersed 
among a great number of people, so as to ensure a complete expression of 
individual  skills  and,  hence,  the  realization  of  the  connected  evolutionary 
potential. It is clarified that this need also implies and requires the operation of 
some other important ethical principles, such as tolerance, free thinking, and 
the  role  of  the  individual.  Consequently,  these  organizational  and  ethical 
needs  appear  to  be  endowed  with  an  objective  substance,  rather  than  the 
subjective one imputed by ethical relativism.
     In the chapter we perform a historical analysis of the presence and the role 
of equality and diversity in past civilizations, a great variety that substantially 
conditioned the evolutionary potential of the considered economic and social 
orders.  Following this we consider  the implications for our analysis  of the 
advent  of  capitalism.  The  chapter  concludes  with  a  delineation  of  some 
relevant teachings on these matters by Keynes and Schumpeter, showing that 
the emphasis of the two authors on, respectively,  the principle of effective 
demand  and  the  role  of  entrepreneurship  provides,  for  different  reasons, 
interesting illumination on ethical and functional thinking. 
Abstract of Chapter 12
This  chapter  sets  out  a  concluding  discussion  of  the  need  for  profound 
reformations  as  demanded  by  the  development  process  and  the  related 
succession of historical ages. If further highlights the important fact that the 
operation of spontaneous forces requires a parallel activity of control, which 
implies  the  interaction  between  spontaneous  order  and  organization.  What 
comes into view here is a growing affliction that troubles the modern world: 
some necessary institutions seem to legitimate capitalism as their progenitor, 
which  induces  an  acceptance  of  a  seemingly  inevitable  and  growing 
inconsistency  between  capitalist  civilizations  and  the  present  and  coming 
phases of development. 
     To clarify this last and vital point: we here delineate a functional need that  
implies the overcoming of capitalism, but in doing so we are careful not to 
identify  capitalism  simply  with  the  operation  of  the  market  and 
entrepreneurship.  We  denominate  such  a  need  the  ‘separation  principle’ 
between  income distribution and production.  Specifically,  we advocate  the 
construction of a market operating as a pure mechanism for the imputation of 
costs and efficiency,  with the profit rate simply acting as a measure of the 
degree  of  success  of  entrepreneurial  decision-making,  but  acting 
independently of the public or private character of the firm. And we give, in 
the final part of the chapter,  a detailed exposition of the nature of such an 
institutional  transformation,  which  in  my opinion  is  an  obligatory  landing 
platform of modern dynamic economies.
